The Public Sector Ombudsman in Greater China: Four “Chinese” Models of Administrative Supervision by Thomson, Stephen
  
 
435 
 
THE PUBLIC SECTOR OMBUDSMAN IN GREATER CHINA: 
  FOUR “CHINESE” MODELS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
SUPERVISION 
 
STEPHEN THOMSON* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Among the challenges facing Greater China, the ombudsman is 
rarely, if ever, considered one of them.  Yet this relatively innocuous 
institution can, under the right conditions, contribute much that is 
beneficial to standards in public administration.  This is the first Ar-
ticle to contrast the models of public sector ombudsman in Mainland 
China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, drawing comparisons on 
such features as institutional function, constitutional and legal sta-
tus, relationship with the executive branch, process, substantive 
powers, effectiveness and transparency.  Even in a region as politi-
cally, constitutionally and economically associated as Greater 
China, four diverse models of ombudsman coexist.  They display 
sharp differences from systemic function to institutional culture, 
and as the region is now on a path of convergence, these are differ-
ences which may soon have to be reconciled.  That reconciliation 
would, as this Article shows, require a major reconceptualization 
and reconfiguration of administrative supervision in at least three of 
the jurisdictions under review. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Public sector ombudsmen can serve as an important mechanism 
for complaints redress against public bodies and for promoting ac-
countability and transparency within the public sector.  They can 
play a useful role in improving standards within public administra-
tion, from reducing corruption and malpractice, to improving effi-
ciency and consistency in decision-making.  However, there is no 
universally agreed model of public sector ombudsman, from the 
level of constitutional status and institutional design, to process and 
practice.  This is sharply illustrated by contrasting the models of 
public sector ombudsman in the Greater China region, namely in 
Mainland China,1 Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan2—a region in 
which there has been significant political, constitutional and eco-
nomic convergence, yet in which there has previously been no ded-
icated comparative assessment of these institutions. 
Historical fragmentation of political power in the region, includ-
ing the colonization of Hong Kong and Macau, and the Chinese 
Communist Revolution, resulted in divergent legal and political tra-
ditions.  The effect of the region’s diverse public law traditions on 
their models of ombudsman, and a specific assessment of their insti-
tutional, conceptual and practical contrasts, has hitherto been little 
explored in the literature.  This is a pertinent area of focus given the 
legal and political challenges faced by and between the region’s con-
stituent jurisdictions, with particular challenges faced with the finite 
provision for the autonomy of Hong Kong3 and Macau4 as Special 
Administrative Regions, and the uncertain potential for reunifica-
tion between the PRC and Taiwan.  These future developments will 
require assessments to be made on the future relationship between 
the jurisdictions, and whether and to what extent an agenda of cen-
tralization, harmonization, pluralization or the status quo should be 
                                                   
1  “Mainland China” will be used to mean the Mainland of the People’s Re-
public of China in order to distinguish it from other jurisdictions in Greater China.  
“PRC” is used for the People’s Republic of China as a whole, which includes the 
Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions. 
2  “Taiwan” and its official name, the “Republic of China” (“ROC”), are used 
without implying a view on the constitutional status of Taiwan. 
3  Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region art. 5 [hereinaf-
ter Basic Law of Hong Kong]. 
4  Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative Region art. 5 [hereinafter 
Basic Law of Macau] [https://perma.cc/VV4A-3QF4]. 
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pursued:  the greater the challenge if either centralization or harmo-
nization is pursued. 
Furthermore, this study has broader appeal as a relevant com-
parison as “Asia has been underrepresented in comparative legal 
and constitutional studies” and “there has been a tendency in com-
parative law, with implications for comparative constitutional law, 
to treat Asian legal systems as homogenous.”5  Any presumption of 
homogenous models of law and legal institutions will be tested and 
challenged in relation to the ombudsman institutions in just one area 
of Asia:  the economic and political powerhouse of Greater China. 
It is worth emphasizing at the outset the constitutional signifi-
cance of ombudsman institutions.  They typically share common 
ideas of monitoring administrative activity for malpractice and de-
ficiency, with aims including the promotion of transparency, ac-
countability and public confidence in administration.  They strive in 
various ways to align administrative practice with particular ethical 
conceptions of public administration.  Importantly, it can be argued 
that the ombudsman function plays a part in upholding constitu-
tional values.6  For example, in the Basic Law of Hong Kong, resi-
dents have the right to social welfare in accordance with law.7  
Whilst this is justiciable as a constitutional right, the work of the 
Ombudsman can promote the right to social welfare by checking for 
maladministration in the conduct of, for example, the Social Welfare 
Department or the Housing Department in their provision of social 
welfare—maladministration which might not necessarily be unlaw-
ful and would therefore not be susceptible to judicial review.  More-
over, residents have a constitutional guarantee to equality before the 
law,8 and this value is also promoted when the Ombudsman checks 
for selective enforcement of rules by public bodies; again, something 
that is not, in itself, unlawful.  Similarly, existing common law val-
ues of constitutionalism and the rule of law continue to have a for-
mal legal basis after the handover of Hong Kong from the United 
                                                   
5  Cheryl Saunders, Towards a Global Constitutional Gene Pool, 4(3) NAT’L 
TAIWAN U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2009). 
6  See TREVOR BUCK, RICHARD KIRKHAM & BRIAN THOMPSON, THE OMBUDSMAN 
ENTERPRISE AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 18–19 (2011) (stressing the importance of 
ombudsmen, and the role they play in the separation of powers). 
7  Basic Law of Hong Kong art. 36. 
8  Id. art. 25. 
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Kingdom to the PRC.9  Common law values such as certainty, pre-
dictability and non-retroactivity in decision-making can be pro-
moted by an effective ombudsman institution reporting on admin-
istrative practice which contravenes these values.  In fostering good 
administrative practice, the values inherent in these constitutional 
provisions are promoted by the ombudsman, perhaps in addition to 
ideas of constitutionalism itself.10 
There has been discussion on where the ombudsman fits in a tri-
partite conception of the constitution as a separation of legislative, 
executive and judicial power.11  Taiwan had to some extent 
preempted that question by erecting its ombudsman institution, the 
Control Yuan, as part of a “five point power” conception of the con-
stitution, though certain of its powers are more extensive than those 
of ombudsmen in other systems.  Bruce Ackerman has written on 
the need to reject Montesquieu’s trinity of state power, citing inde-
pendent electoral commissions and central banks as examples of in-
stitutions placing strain on the traditional tripartite conception of 
the state bureaucracy.12  Similarly, ombudsmen play such a role in 
the constitution, even if in a less direct way than in Taiwan.  In short, 
the significance of the ombudsman is not only in relation to admin-
istrative practice, but also to the constitutional implications of the 
ways in which public administration is constrained and influenced 
by ombudsman institutions. 
This Article explores four diverse models of public sector om-
budsman in the four constituent jurisdictions of Greater China.  It 
begins with an outline of the ombudsmen in the region, then ex-
                                                   
9  Id. art. 8. 
10 See, e.g., Albert H. Y. Chen, A Tale of Two Islands: Comparative Reflections on 
Constitutionalism in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 37 HONG KONG L.J. 647 (2007) (discuss-
ing constitutional experimentation in the last two decades in Asia, arguing for 
Hong Kong’s Basic Law success and international recognition as well as Taiwan’s 
peaceful transition from authoritarianism to democracy). 
11 BUCK, KIRKHAM & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 15–19. 
12 See Bruce Ackerman, Good-bye, Montesquieu, in COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 128–33 (Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth eds., 
2010) (arguing for reconceptualization of the comparative law analysis framework 
that would move beyond Montesquieu’s orthodox reflections on the separation of 
powers); see also Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
633 (2000) (arguing that there is no reason to assume the classical writers have ex-
hausted all possible models and interpretations of the separation of powers doc-
trine; calling to seek new constitutional forms, transcending long-standing trinitar-
ian principles). 
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plores particular aspects of the institutions, their powers and pro-
cesses.  First, the institutional function of the ombudsman will be 
considered, before examining whether and to what extent each ju-
risdiction adopts a more consolidated or more dispersed institu-
tional model.  The constitutional and legal status of each ombuds-
man will then be set out, followed by a discussion of their respective 
relationships with the executive branch.  Finally, the procedural and 
substantive powers of each ombudsman will be explained, before an 
evaluation of their effectiveness and transparency. 
 
2.  OUTLINE OF PUBLIC SECTOR OMBUDSMEN IN GREATER CHINA 
 
A preliminary outline of each public sector ombudsman is nec-
essary before discussing the specific characteristics of each institu-
tion.  This is also useful for establishing an initial context within 
which to set each institution, as a purely functional comparison may 
overstate the comparability of the institutions under review.13  The 
respective public sector ombudsmen of the four constituent jurisdic-
tions of Greater China are:  (i) the Ministry of Supervision (Mainland 
China); (ii) the Ombudsman (Hong Kong); (iii) the Commission 
Against Corruption (Macau); and (iv) the Control Yuan (Taiwan). 
 
2.1.  Mainland China 
 
Formally, the Ministry of Supervision (监察部) (“MOS”) per-
forms the state ombudsman function in Mainland China.14  Defined 
                                                   
13 See also Saunders, supra note 5, at 6; Vicki C. Jackson, Methodological Chal-
lenges in Comparative Constitutional Law, 28 PENN ST. INT’L. L. REV. 319, 325-326 (2009) 
(noting that conducting a comparative analysis of constitutions at the functional 
level is essential for developing a better understanding of other systems). 
14 There are particular challenges in determining practice within the Ministry 
of Supervision and its subsidiaries due to a lack of publicly available information, 
as another author has acknowledged.  See Thomas Stephan Eder, “China”, in ASIAN 
OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 92 (Ursula Kriebaum & 
Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer eds., 2016) (stating that “no information could be ob-
tained” in relation to MOS practice).  The same author made this observation with 
regard to practice within the State Bureau of Letters and Visits (“SBLV”), which also 
performs ombudswork.  See id., at 98.  While the SBLV has been increasingly criti-
cized in media and policy outlets for lack of effectiveness (and noting also that the 
SBLV is not presented by Mainland China as the state ombudsman), the MOS has 
received less scrutiny in this regard. 
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by law to be in charge of supervision throughout the jurisdiction,15 
this is a government institution under the State Council with a num-
ber of subsidiary supervisory authorities at the provincial and local 
levels.  The MOS was established in 1949 as the People’s Supervisory 
Commission, reconstituted with its present title in 1954, abolished 
in 1959 and re-established in 1987.  It is a member of the Asian Om-
budsman Association, but not the International Ombudsman Insti-
tute.16 
Prior to the re-establishment of the MOS, the Central Commis-
sion for Discipline Inspection (“CCDI”) exercised disciplinary juris-
diction over members of the Communist Party of China (the 
“Party”) holding public office.  The MOS was given jurisdiction over 
cases involving public officeholders, whether or not they were mem-
bers of the Party.  As most public officeholders were (and are) Party 
members, both organizations were often involved in the investiga-
tion process.  The MOS was operationally merged with the CCDI in 
1993, though the two retain separate organizational identities.  The 
MOS and the CCDI have a shared website.17  The MOS, which has 
around 800 employees,18 has been described as a “nominal compo-
nent” of the State Council, which is directly under the leadership of 
the CCDI and “may be regarded as part of it.”19  This would suggest 
that the Party is the principal agency of supervision, rather than the 
state as such.  However, Andrew Wedeman has argued that annual 
reports show that discipline inspection committees under the CCDI 
largely supervise individuals, whilst the MOS largely supervises in-
stitutions.20  This potentially differentiates the work of the MOS and 
                                                   
15 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative Supervision 
(adopted at the 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People’s Congress, May 9, 1997; amended by Decision of the Standing Committee 
of the Eleventh National People’s Congress Revising the Law of the People’s Re-
public of China on Administrative Supervision, June 25, 2010) art. 7 [hereafter Law 
on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)], http://en.pkulaw.cn/Dis-
play.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=134401 [https://perma.cc/B2JJ-ERJH]. 
16 The Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese institutions do not share membership 
of the same organizations, perhaps for political reasons. 
17 CCDI & MOS, http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/ [https://perma.cc/WWA4-FTPS] 
(LAST VISITED Nov. 28, 2017) (in Chinese). 
18 Eder, supra note 14, at 88. 
19 Guo Yong, The Evolvement of the Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection 
Commission in the Reform Era, 12 THE CHINA REV. 1, 2 (2012). 
20 Andrew Wedeman, The Intensification of Corruption in China, 180 THE CHINA 
Q. 895, 900–01 (2004) (arguing that corruption intensified after the advent of re-
forms). 
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the CCDI to the extent that there may remain distinctiveness be-
tween their respective jurisdictions and scope of work.  In that vein, 
it has elsewhere been stated that the MOS is the administrative 
equivalent of the CCDI,21 but that the CCDI may be regarded as the 
more powerful of the two agencies.22 
Nevertheless, whilst the Mainland presents the MOS to the re-
gion as its public sector ombudsman—the MOS, rather than the 
CCDI, being a member of the Asian Ombudsman Association—it 
will be seen that in practical terms the MOS is subordinate to the 
Party, which retains the upper hand in matters of administrative su-
pervision.  However, it is still the MOS that is designated as Main-
land China’s public sector ombudsman. 
It is important to note that Mainland-wide reforms are on the 
horizon with regard to the mechanism for administrative supervi-
sion, with a Pilot Program being run in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi 
Province and Zhejiang Province.23  Nevertheless, this Article de-
scribes the existing system for four main reasons.  First, nationwide 
                                                   
21 Yasheng Huang, Administrative Monitoring in China, 143 THE CHINA Q. 828, 
836 (1995). 
22 Id., at 837. 
23 See Decision Carrying out the Pilot Program of Reforming the National Su-
pervision Mechanism in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province and Zhejiang Prov-
ince (adopted at the 25th Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National 
People’s Congress on Dec. 25, 2016; effective Dec. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Pilot Pro-
gram Decision (Mainland China)], http://en.pkulaw.cn/dis-
play.aspx?cgid=287285&lib=law [https://perma.cc/EFZ3-G5RV].  It is provided 
that supervision committees shall also be established at county, city, and municipal 
level within those regions.  Introduced in the context of anti-corruption reforms, 
one of the main objectives appears to be centralization of the administrative super-
vision function.  This is seen in the investment of powers in the new supervision 
committees to supervise “all civil servants,” which would include members and 
non-members of the Party.  At present, the CCDI supervises Party members, 
whereas the MOS has jurisdiction over public officeholders whether or not they are 
Party members.  Whilst this is a significant legal change, it is unclear to what extent 
it represents a significant practical change, as the CCDI and MOS already work 
closely.  Centralization is also seen in the absorption by the supervision committees 
of the relevant functions of the MOS subsidiaries and the NCPB subsidiaries in Bei-
jing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang.  The relevant existing legal provisions on administrative 
supervision “shall be temporarily adjusted or ceased” in Beijing, Shanxi, and 
Zhejiang to enable the new supervision committees to be established.  It appears, 
nevertheless, that CCDI, MOS, SPP and NCPB subsidiaries will continue to exist 
with their own functions.  See e.g., The State Council Information Office of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, China’s New Supervision System to Cover All Public Authori-
ties (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/Docu-
ment/1518891/1518891.htm [https://perma.cc/WK4K-WMGP] (citing the 
objective of such reforms as making the existing supervision system more efficient, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/3
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reform has not yet been formally announced.  Second, a sufficient 
level of detail on the Pilot Program is not yet available.  Third, to the 
extent that the Pilot Program may serve as a blueprint for nation-
wide reform, there may be modifications applied when nationwide 
reforms are introduced.  Finally, though the Pilot Program imple-
ments structural changes, it does not at this stage appear to be sig-
nificantly different from the current system in terms of substance, 
powers and context. 
 
2.2.  Hong Kong 
 
The Ombudsman (申訴專員公署) of Hong Kong was first estab-
lished in 1989 as the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints, 
becoming known as the Ombudsman from 1996, and essentially 
constructed on the New Zealand and UK models of the ombuds-
man.  It absorbed part of the work of the Redress System of the Of-
fice of Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils 
(“OMELCO”), previously known as the Office of the Unofficial 
Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (“UMELCO”).24  
Whilst the Ombudsman is an individual, she is supported by an of-
fice of around 120 regular staff (including a Deputy Ombudsman 
and two Assistant Ombudsmen) and a panel of advisers, and is now 
established as a corporation sole.  Her powers are statutory in na-
ture, derived from the Ombudsman Ordinance (cap. 397).  As will 
be explained, her jurisdiction is over instances of maladministration 
committed by specified public bodies in their exercise of adminis-
trative functions.  She is not directly engaged in performing anti-
corruption work.  The Ombudsman is a member of both the Asian 
                                                   
and pointing out that the aim for deepened reform of the current supervision sys-
tem is to build a national anti-graft organ under the leadership of the Party).  It also 
suggests that the Pilot Program is intended to be a forerunner to nationwide reform.  
It would be unlikely that the Pilot Program would be declared a failure or having 
failed to have achieved its objectives in Beijing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang, so the Pilot 
Program is likely intended to resolve practical issues in the implementation of the 
reforms with the intention of pressing ahead with nationwide reform.  There will, 
of course, be further developments to come. 
24 The Legislative Council Redress System now embodies the Redress System 
previously operated by UMELCO and OMELCO.  Whilst the Legislative Council 
Redress System appears still to be capable of dealing with complaints about mal-
administration, the Ombudsman is the principal institution with jurisdiction over 
maladministration. 
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Ombudsman Association and the International Ombudsman Insti-
tute. 
 
2.3.  Macau 
 
The Commission Against Corruption (澳门廉政公署, Comissar-
iado contra a Corrupção) (“CCAC”) performs the public sector om-
budsman function in Macau.  It was preceded by the High Commis-
sion Against Corruption and Administrative Illegality set up in 
1992, with reasonable continuity in terms of its structure and staffing 
arrangements.  The CCAC was established under Article 59 of the 
Basic Law of Macau, effective on the establishment of the Macau 
Special Administrative Region on 20 December 1999 on the transfer 
of sovereignty from Portugal to the PRC.  It combines the dual func-
tion of anti-corruption work and ombudswork.  The CCAC is 
headed by the Commissioner Against Corruption, who holds the 
status of a public authority.25  He may nominate two deputy com-
missioners to be appointed and dismissed by the Chief Executive,26 
and appoint support staff and advisers.27  The CCAC is a member of 
both the Asian Ombudsman Association and the International Om-
budsman Institute. 
 
2.4.  Taiwan 
 
The ombudsman function in Taiwan is performed by the Control 
Yuan (監察院).28  It is one of five branches of the state, three of which 
(the Legislative Yuan, the Executive Yuan and the Judicial Yuan) 
broadly align with their western counterparts, and two of which (the 
                                                   
25 Law No 10/2000, Organic Law of the Commission Against Corruption (as 
amended by Law No 4/2012) art. 19 [hereinafter Organic Law of CCAC (Macau)], 
http://images.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2000/33/lei-10-2000.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AAJ6-NXB8]. 
26 Id. art. 24, § 1. 
27 Id. arts. 29–30. 
28 See Yeong-kuang Ger, Institutional Design and Development in the ROC (Tai-
wan): A Critical Review of the Thoughts of Sun Yat-sen and the Global Development of the 
Ombudsman System, 4 MD. SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1 (2011) (discussing the 
origins of the Control Yuan and its functions). 
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Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan) have their origins in tra-
ditional concepts of Chinese government and constitutional the-
ory.29  Created in 1931, and then officially established under the ROC 
Constitution in 1948, it has been traced to ancient supervisory func-
tions performed in China.30  The Control Yuan has its constitutional 
foundation in Article 90 and Additional Article 7 of the ROC Con-
stitution, where it is designated as the highest supervisory body of 
the state with the powers of impeachment, censure and audit.31 
The role played by the Control Yuan has substantially changed 
over time.32  For example, its members used to be elected by provin-
cial and municipal councils, and in that context the Judicial Yuan 
issued a constitutional interpretation whereby the Control Yuan, 
along with the—now suspended—National Assembly and the Leg-
islative Yuan, “from the perspective of the nature of their statuses 
and functions in the Constitution, should be considered as equiva-
lent to the parliaments of democratic nations.”33  However, when 
members came to be nominated by the President of the ROC and 
confirmed by the National Assembly, the Control Yuan was no 
                                                   
29 See Herbert Han-Pao Ma, The Chinese Control Yuan: An Independent Supervi-
sory Organ of the State, 4 WASH. U.L.Q. 401, 401–03 (1963) (explaining the historical 
origins of the Control Yuan). 
30 See Ger, supra note 28, at 4–14 (detailing historical, political traditions in 
China with emphasis on ancient supervisory functions). 
31 See Const. of the Republic of China (Additional Articles) art. 7, § 1 (1947), 
https://www.ey.gov.tw/pda_en/Upload/WebArchive/4697/Constitution.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5YBX-PBG7].  Impeachment and censure powers are exercised 
under the Control Act of the Republic of China (promulgated by Presidential de-
cree, July 17, 1948, amended 1949-1992) [hereinafter Control Act (Taiwan)], 
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3158&mp=21&CtNode=1734&returnct-
Node=1734&returnxItem=3139 [https://perma.cc/YW42-A8GX], whereas audit 
powers are exercised under the Audit Act (promulgated by Presidential decree, 
Nov. 11, 1998).  The audit function is carried out by the Ministry of Audit (National 
Audit Office), which is a subordinate part of the Control Yuan.  Previously there 
was an Audit Yuan, established in 1928, but this was brought under the Control 
Yuan in 1931.  Today asset declarations by public officials and political donations 
are required to be reported to the Control Yuan.  See Ger, supra note 28, at 38–39 
(describing the Political Donations Act and the power it provides to the Control 
Yuan to control and supervise political candidates). 
32 See Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Cheng Chang, Emergence of East Asian Constitu-
tionalism: Features in Comparison, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 805, 822 (2011) (noting that the 
Control Yuan in 2011 played a “very different role” than in 1948). 
33 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION NO. 76 (1957), http://www.judi-
cial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=76 
[https://perma.cc/CJ8D-T3JZ]; see also Ma, supra note 29, at 425 (stating the Control 
Yuan’s functions and powers were “similar to those important powers exercised by 
the parliaments of democratic nations”). 
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longer a central representative authority, and that interpretation 
was deemed no longer applicable.34  The Control Yuan is not con-
sidered a quasi-judicial organization, but rather an ombudsman.35  
Whereas an ombudsman is often a defined person acting with the 
corporate support of an office or bureaucracy, the Control Yuan is a 
collegiate entity comprising twenty-nine members as mandated by 
the ROC Constitution.36  This includes a president and a vice presi-
dent.  The Control Yuan is a member of the International Ombuds-
man Institute, but not the Asian Ombudsman Association.37 
 
3.  INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTION 
 
The institutions under review perform distinguishable func-
tions, suggesting variance in the conception of the state ombudsman 
function, even in an area as politically, economically and (particu-
larly in relation to Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau) consti-
tutionally associated as Greater China. 
The Law on Administrative Supervision is the main piece of leg-
islation regulating the supervisory work of the MOS.  It was enacted 
to “guarantee the smooth implementation of government decrees, 
maintain administrative discipline, facilitate the building of an hon-
est and clean government, improve administration and raise admin-
istrative efficiency.”38  The MOS has jurisdiction over departments 
under the State Council, public servants working in such depart-
ments, other persons appointed by the State Council and the depart-
ments under it, and the governments of provinces, autonomous re-
gions and municipalities directly under the Central People’s 
Government and the leading members of such governments.39  It 
                                                   
34 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION NO. 325 (1993), http://www.judi-
cial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=325 
[https://perma.cc/R6JH-53JQ]. 
35 See Ger, supra note 28, at 15–16 (explaining why it is improper to refer to the 
Control Yuan as a quasi-judicial body). 
36 See Const. of the Republic of China (Additional Articles) art. 7, § 2. 
37 See supra note 16. 
38 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 1. 
39 Id. art. 15. 
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also has the power to handle matters of supervision within the juris-
diction of subsidiary supervisory organs.40  The MOS and its subsid-
iaries have jurisdiction over complaints about the police, together 
with the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (“SPP”), its subsidiaries 
and internal police review agencies.41  The standard complaints 
mechanism against the police is through the Complaint Redress De-
partment of the Ministry of Public Security. 
The work of the MOS ranges from fighting corruption to pro-
moting efficiency in public administration.  It shall “organize, coor-
dinate, examine, and guide the work related to promoting political 
affairs transparency and rectification of malpractice that damage[s] 
the interest of the general public.”42  Its jurisdiction is over political, 
economic and administrative discipline.  Political offences include 
insubordination, spreading lies and falsehoods, and revealing state 
or Party secrets.  Economic offences include bribery, fraud and wast-
ing public resources.  Finally, administrative offences include bu-
reaucratism, error in policy-making, dereliction of duty, negligence, 
abdication of authority, unsatisfactory management, indiscriminate 
use of authority for private gain, use of public funds for banquets, 
entertainment, gifts and holidays, and “degeneracy.”43 
The focus of the Ombudsman of Hong Kong’s work is malad-
ministration, though this is defined only in general terms: 
inefficient, bad or improper administration and, without 
derogation from the generality of the foregoing, includes— 
(a) unreasonable conduct, including delay, discourtesy and 
lack of consideration for a person affected by any action; 
(b) abuse of any power (including any discretionary power) 
or authority including any action which— 
  (i)  is unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly 
discriminatory or which is  in accordance with a prac-
                                                   
40 Id. art. 17. 
41 See People’s Police Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the 
12th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress 
on Feb. 28, 1995; revised Oct. 26, 2012), arts. 42, 46 [hereinafter Police Law (Main-
land China)], http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=13221&lib=law 
[https://perma.cc/8FU9-XQP5]. 
42 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 18. 
43 Wedeman, supra note 20, at 901–02. 
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tice which is or may be unreasonable, unjust,oppres-
sive or improperly discriminatory; or 
  (ii) was based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or 
fact; or 
(c) unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discrimi-
natory procedures.44 
This is clearly not an exhaustive definition, and the Ombudsman 
takes maladministration to include—but not be limited to—abuse of 
power, delay, inaction, disparity in treatment, unfairness, error, 
wrong advice or decision, failure to follow procedures, faulty pro-
cedures, ineffective control, lack of response or reply to complainant 
or enquirer, negligence, omissions, selective enforcement, and poor 
staff attitude.45  Notably, maladministration includes lawful and un-
lawful conduct and the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over both.  
Since unlawful conduct is susceptible to judicial review in the 
courts, there is potential for overlap between the jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsman and the courts. 
The Ombudsman can investigate the administrative functions of 
an array of public bodies which are included in Schedule 1 of the 
Ombudsman Ordinance.  These range from government depart-
ments and the Equal Opportunities Commission to the public 
broadcaster.  It should be noted that the Ombudsman has the power 
to investigate the administrative functions of such bodies, which 
would appear to exclude judicial functions.  Excluded from the or-
dinary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman are the Independent Com-
mission Against Corruption (“ICAC”),46 Hong Kong Police Force, 
Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force, and Secretariat of the Public Ser-
vice Commission.  These bodies are subject to the scrutiny of the 
Ombudsman only in relation to the Code on Access to Information, 
a non-binding set of guidelines on freedom of information.47 
There are various restrictions on the Ombudsman’s power to in-
vestigate allegations of maladministration, including a prohibition 
                                                   
44 Ombudsman Ordinance, Cap. 397, § 2(1) (Hong Kong) (1996) [hereinafter 
Ombudsman Ordinance (Hong Kong)], https://www.elegisla-
tion.gov.hk/hk/cap397?p0=1&p1=1 [https://perma.cc/5ZWP-UYUH]. 
45 See OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THE OMBUDSMAN’S ROLE AND JURISDICTION: 
WHAT IS MALADMINISTRATION (2013), http://www.ombudsman.hk/en-
us/about_this_office/role_and_jurisdiction.html [https://perma.cc/TG6A-PF67]. 
46 See generally infra Sections 4, 5, and 6. 
47 Ombudsman Ordinance (Hong Kong), § 7(1)(b). 
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on the investigation of: matters affecting security, defense or inter-
national relations; the commencement or conduct of court or tribu-
nal proceedings; contractual and commercial transactions (exclud-
ing tendering procedures); personnel matters; and government land 
decisions.48 
The CCAC of Macau is tasked with examining both legality and 
“administrative correctness.”49  Its main operational divisions are 
the Cabinet of the Commissioner, the Anti-Corruption Bureau, and 
the Ombudsman Bureau.  The Ombudsman Bureau, which is com-
prised of an investigation arm and a research arm, is responsible for: 
receiving complaints and investigating allegations of administrative 
wrongdoing; protecting individual rights, freedoms, safeguards, 
and legitimate interests; contributing to fairness, transparency, jus-
tice and efficiency in public administration; making recommenda-
tions to correct unlawful and unfair acts; and recommending im-
provements to administrative procedures and systems.50 
The Anti-Corruption Bureau is principally focused on criminal 
activity, though cases involving both criminal and administrative 
offenses are coordinated with the Ombudsman Bureau.51  In addi-
tion to jurisdiction over public bodies, the CCAC’s ombudsman 
oversight extends to companies which are under full or majority 
public ownership.52  Its specific anti-bribery oversight, however, ex-
tends to the private sector.53  There is provision for limited ombuds-
man oversight of “relationships between private individuals involv-
ing a special relation of dominance, within the scope of the 
protection of rights, freedoms and safeguards.”54  Notably, the 
CCAC performs both an ombudsman and an anti-corruption func-
                                                   
48 Id. § 8 and sched. 2. 
49 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 4(5). 
50 Id. art. 3(1)(5); Admin. Reg. No. 3/2013, Amend. to Admin. Reg. No. 3/2009: 
Organization and Operation of the Commission Against Corruption (promulgated 
by Macau Special Admin. Region, Mar. 18, 2013), art. 23 [hereinafter Admin. Reg. 
No. 3/2013 (Macau)], http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2013/12/regadm03_cn.asp 
[https://perma.cc/EK64-NAS7]. 
51 Admin. Reg. No. 3/2013 (Macau) arts. 17(3), 22(3). 
52 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 2-A(2). 
53 Id. arts. 2-A, 3(1)(1), 3(1)(3), 4(1); Law No. 19/2009, Prevention and Suppres-
sion of Bribery in the Private Sector (enacted by the Legis. Assembly), art. 7(1) (Ma-
cau), http://www.ccac.org.mo/PrivSec/en/law/01.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7MWL-Q4U4]. 
54 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 2-A(2). 
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tion, whereas the Ombudsman of Hong Kong performs only the for-
mer. 
The scope of the Taiwanese Control Yuan’s jurisdiction is exten-
sive.  It has the power to investigate cases involving other Yuans, 
and its power of impeachment also extends over personnel of the 
Control Yuan.55  The Control Yuan even has the power of impeach-
ment over judges,56 which might be taboo in other systems in the 
name of judicial independence.  It does not, however, have the 
power of impeachment over the President, Vice President, and leg-
islators.  The President and Vice President are impeached on the in-
itiative of the Legislative Yuan and adjudicated upon by the Grand 
Justices of the Judicial Yuan,57 whereas legislators are accountable 
through democratic channels.  Nevertheless, it seems that the Con-
trol Yuan may apply a lower intensity of review when investigating 
an elected official for impeachment, to avoid trespassing on the 
power of electors to recall that official from office through demo-
cratic mechanisms.58 
The Control Yuan was required to establish a Department of Su-
pervisory Operations, Department of Supervisory Investigation, De-
partment of Asset Declaration by Public Functionaries, Secretariat, 
General Planning Office and Information Management Office,59 in 
addition to the National Audit Office.60  It has a Special Committee 
on Anti-Corruption, though whilst this would primarily operate in 
the context of impeachment, censure and proposal of corrective 
measures; criminal investigation and prosecution of corruption is 
the responsibility of the Agency Against Corruption, which is part 
of the Ministry of Justice. 
The Control Yuan has a Human Rights Protection Committee 
and can investigate alleged human rights violations.  However, it 
                                                   
55 Id. art. 7(4). 
56 See, e.g., Ger, supra note 28, at 22–23 (providing statistics and examples of 
judges who were impeached by the Control Yuan). 
57 See Const. of the Republic of China (Additional Articles) arts. 2(9)–(10).  The 
Control Yuan formerly had the power to impeach the President and Vice President 
under Article 100 of the ROC Constitution. 
58 See Ger, supra note 28, at 24–26.  A relatively recent example of an elected 
official being impeached is William Lai, Mayor of Tainan.  Tsai Wen-Chu, Control 
Yuan to Impeach Tainan Mayor Lai, TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.taipei-
times.com/News/front/archives/2015/08/05/2003624642 
[https://perma.cc/C9SK-27ET]. 
59 Organic Law of the Control Yuan (amended May 19, 2010) art. 10. 
60 Id. art. 4. 
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has been proposed that a national human rights commission be es-
tablished as it has been doubted whether the Control Yuan has the 
necessary capacity and focus to monitor human rights.61  Neverthe-
less, in 2015, the most recent year for which figures are available, 
over 82% of all complaints handled by the Control Yuan raised hu-
man rights issues.62 
The institutional functions of the public sector ombudsmen 
therefore exhibit different areas of emphasis.  In Mainland China, 
the focus of the MOS is on administrative discipline and, perhaps 
increasingly, anti-corruption.  The work of the Ombudsman of 
Hong Kong is concerned with addressing maladministration but not 
corruption,63 whilst Macau’s CCAC is engaged in tackling both cor-
ruption and administrative malpractice.  The Control Yuan of Tai-
wan, meanwhile, is primarily an institution of impeachment, cen-
sure, audit, and—to some extent—human rights protection.  While 
there are areas of overlap between the work of these institutions, 
there are clear differences in emphasis. 
 
4.  CONSOLIDATED VERSUS DISPERSED INSTITUTIONAL MODELS 
 
The Greater Chinese jurisdictions exhibit different approaches to 
whether ombudsman functions are consolidated in one or more 
closely associated institutions or distributed among a more dis-
persed array of bodies. 
It might have been expected that Mainland China would display 
strong characteristics of a consolidated model of public sector om-
budsman, given its tendency to centralized power and decision-
making.  However, it adopts a blend of consolidated and dispersed 
approaches. Ombudswork is undertaken by a range of institutions, 
with the MOS being one of four anti-corruption agencies in Main-
land China, the others being the CCDI, the SPP (in which there is an 
Anti-Corruption Bureau), and the National Corruption Prevention 
                                                   
61 See Yu-jie Chen, Human Rights in China-Taiwan Relations: How Taiwan Can 
Engage China, 45 H.K.L.J. 565, 588 (2015) (discussing how “some experts have ques-
tioned whether the Control Yuan has the capacity and the focus that an institution 
dedicated to human rights matters should have”). 
62  TAIWAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA: ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE CONTROL YUAN, 27 (2015), http://www.cy.gov.tw/dl.asp?file-
Name=671513451471.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L9K-DERT]. 
63 See infra Sections 4 and 6. 
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Bureau (“NCPB”).64  The Xinhua News Agency plays a role in gath-
ering information related to corruption.65  The system of complaint 
letters and visits affords a further opportunity for persons to express 
grievances with public officers and the conduct of public admin-
istration.66  Complaints about judicial cases can be made to the Com-
plaint Redress Department of the Supreme People’s Court, whilst 
jurisdiction over police complaints is shared between the MOS, the 
SPP and its subsidiaries, internal police review agencies and the 
Complaint Redress Department of the Ministry of Public Security.  
This points to a dispersed institutional model in Mainland China, 
with a range of institutions involved in the performance of ombuds-
work. 
However, there are also signs of consolidation in the current sys-
tem.  There is overlap in key personnel of the MOS, CCDI and 
NCPB.67  The current practice is for the Minister of Supervision to 
simultaneously hold the position of Deputy Secretary of the CCDI 
and the position of Director of the NCPB.68  Importantly, as the Min-
ister of Supervision is the Deputy Secretary of the CCDI, he is in that 
                                                   
64 See generally Jon S.T. Quah, Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China: 
An Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 
2015), MD. SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1, 4 (2015) (“After becoming the General 
Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) at 
the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, Xi launched an anti-corruption cam-
paign to eliminate the ‘tigers and flies’ who had become rich through bribery and 
patronage.”). 
65 See John L. Thornton, Long Time Coming: The Prospects for Democracy in China, 
87 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 7 (2008) (providing that one of the functions of the Xinhua News 
Agency “is to gather information on corruption nationwide and produce internal 
reports for the central leadership”). 
66 See Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (promulgated by Decree No. 
431 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Jan. 5, 2005, effective May 
1, 2005) [hereinafter Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (Mainland China)], 
http://www.china.org.cn/e-news/news050428-3.htm [https://perma.cc/2AUH-
AVKS]; see also infra Section 8. 
67 See 3 THE CHINA LEGAL DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK: ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 13, n.18 (Li Lin ed., 2009) (describing overlap of key person-
nel). 
68  The recent career experience of the current Minister of Supervision, Yang 
Xiaodu, appears largely to have been in the CCDI and other Party roles, perhaps 
indicating the tenor of his work and experience.  This is in contrast to that of the 
Ombudsman of Hong Kong, Connie Lau Yin Hing, who previously served as 
Chairman of the UN Consumer Protection Rights Advisory Group and as the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Consumer Council in Hong Kong, her recent background 
generally being in public service.  The Commissioner Against Corruption in Macau, 
Cheong Weng Chon, was previously Director of the Legal Affairs Bureau for 14 
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capacity subordinate to the Secretary of the CCDI, who is typically 
a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Party.  This 
indicates the relationship between the state and Party machinery, 
including their actual or perceived order of precedence.  Whilst the 
MOS and its subsidiaries are deemed to be subject to no interference 
from administrative departments, public organizations or individu-
als,69 the degree of control, de facto or otherwise, the Party is capable 
of exerting over the MOS and its subsidiaries, means that the MOS 
must in practice be strongly influenced by the Party, whether or not 
this constitutes “interference.”  The Mainland Chinese picture is 
therefore a mixed approach of consolidated and dispersed models—
a range of actors and institutions participating in the execution of 
ombudsman functions, but ultimately unified under the control of 
the Party.  Further consolidation may be in store with the Pilot Pro-
gram in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Prov-
ince, combining the functions of MOS subsidiaries and NCPB sub-
sidiaries in the new supervision committees in those regions,70 
stated to “effectively strengthen the leadership of the Party.”71 
The two Special Administrative Regions display a strong degree 
of consolidation.  The ombudsman function in Hong Kong is vested 
primarily in the Ombudsman, with anti-corruption functions vested 
in the ICAC, a separate institution.  As ombudswork can be func-
tionally distinguished from anti-corruption work, this represents a 
strong degree of consolidated power in the two institutions.  The 
work of the Ombudsman (and ICAC) is complemented by parallel 
redress systems, such as the Legislative Council Redress System,72 
and the Complaints Against Police Office with oversight by the In-
dependent Police Complaints Council.  However, primary oversight 
for maladministration in the public sector is vested in the Ombuds-
man. 
In Macau, there is a greater degree of consolidation.  Whilst there 
are parallel complaint redress systems in operation, including the 
                                                   
years.  The President of the Control Yuan of Taiwan, Chang Po-ya, has a back-
ground primarily in public service, whilst the Vice President of the Control Yuan, 
Sun Ta-chuan, has a background in academia and public service. 
69 Law on Admin. Supervision (Mainland China) art. 3. 
70 See Pilot Program Decision (Mainland China), supra note 23. 
71 Id. 
72 Formerly known as the Redress System of UMELCO and OMELCO.  See su-
pra Section 2.2. 
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Public Information Centre and the Macau Security Forces Discipli-
nary Committee,73 the CCAC is vested with both ombudsman and 
anti-corruption functions, unlike its Hong Kong counterpart where 
these have been separated into different institutions.  In addition, 
whereas the Ombudsman of Hong Kong is a statutory creation, the 
CCAC enjoys a constitutional foothold and therefore has greater for-
mal and structural entrenchment than the Ombudsman of Hong 
Kong.74 
Institutional consolidation is also high in Taiwan, all the more so 
considering the Control Yuan has a comparatively strong degree of 
institutional independence and constitutional equality with other 
branches of the state.75  The Control Yuan is not the sole performer 
of ombudsman and anti-corruption functions in Taiwan.  When 
members have made a determination of impeachment, the case is 
turned over to a competent disciplinary organ for action, typically a 
commission of the Judicial Yuan.76  Importantly, however, the Con-
trol Yuan is vested with the power of impeachment—usually found 
in legislatures—which, apart from formal consequences for the im-
peached official, also carries significant reputational indictment.  It 
therefore represents the investment of considerable constitutional 
and political authority in an ombudsman institution.  Furthermore, 
the Control Yuan is the only institution under review that is also 
vested with an active role in the protection of human rights. 
There is a broad pattern of consolidated power across the 
Greater Chinese jurisdictions, but this takes different forms.  In Tai-
wan, consolidation occurs through the medium of a hierarchically 
equal constitutional footing for the Control Yuan, while in Macau it 
is seen through the unification of the ombudsman and anti-corrup-
tion functions in the CCAC, which is given a specific constitutional 
foothold.  In Hong Kong, the ombudsman and anti-corruption func-
tions are separated, and then vested in two dedicated institutions, 
namely the Ombudsman and the ICAC, respectively.  Meanwhile, 
Mainland China opts for an ostensibly dispersed model, with a 
range of different actors and institutions participating in ombuds-
work and anti-corruption work, but operating within a system of de 
                                                   
73 Asian Ombudsman Association, Fact Sheet: Commission Against Corruption, 
Macau, 6 (2010) [hereinafter Asian Ombudsman Association (Macau)]. 
74 See infra Sections 5 and 6. 
75 Id. 
76 For a further discussion on process and substantive powers of the Control 
Yuan, see infra Section 7. 
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facto consolidation under the overarching authority of the Party.  
Whereas consolidation is formally institutionalized through consti-
tutional or legislative instruments in Hong Kong, Macau, and Tai-
wan, it is discerned in Mainland China through the underlying po-
litical authority of the ruling party. 
 
5.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STATUS 
 
The ombudsman institutions enjoy different constitutional and 
legal statuses.  The most firmly established is the Control Yuan of 
Taiwan, which is entrenched by Additional Article 7 of the ROC 
Constitution.  While this does not spell complete autonomy from the 
other branches,77 its erection as a formally equal institutional pillar 
of the state gives it a solid constitutional and legal foundation.  The 
only other institution to enjoy an express constitutional foothold is 
the CCAC of Macau, for which there is specific provision in the Basic 
Law of Macau.78  This, again, does not mean that it functions with 
complete autonomy from other state institutions,79 but it does pro-
vide for a formal constitutional guarantee of independence and 
means that it could not be abolished by ordinary legislation of the 
Macanese legislature. 
By contrast, the Ombudsman of Hong Kong enjoys no such con-
stitutional entrenchment, as it is founded on ordinary legislation.  
Whilst there is no obvious reason why there should be political ap-
petite to do so, this means that the Ombudsman can be modified or 
abolished by ordinary legislation of the Legislative Council in Hong 
Kong.  The ICAC is constitutionally entrenched in the Basic Law of 
Hong Kong,80 just as is the CCAC of Macau; however, the ICAC is 
tasked solely with an anti-corruption function, rather than the per-
formance of broader ombudswork.  It is nevertheless worth ac-
knowledging that there are questions as to whether entrenchment 
in the Basic Law of either Hong Kong or Macau is “real” constitu-
tional entrenchment, given the contested nature of the constitutional 
status of the Basic Law of each Special Administrative Region. 
                                                   
77 For a further discussion on the Control Yuan’s relationship with the execu-
tive branch, see infra Section 6. 
78 Basic Law of Macau art. 59. 
79 For a further discussion on the CCAC’s relationship with the executive 
branch, see infra Section 6. 
80 Basic Law of Hong Kong art. 57. 
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No specific constitutional provision is made in Mainland China 
for the MOS.  Accordingly, the MOS can be reorganized, redefined, 
or abolished by the NPC.  The Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong 
ombudsman institutions therefore enjoy no constitutional entrench-
ment, unlike their Macanese and Taiwanese counterparts. 
 
6.  RELATIONSHIP WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
 
One of the structural features that can assist the effectiveness of 
an ombudsman and public confidence that the ombudsman is an in-
dependent monitor of public administration, is the extent to which 
it is appropriately distanced from the executive.81  There are essen-
tially three ways in which the ombudsman can be related to the ex-
ecutive:  (i) as part of the executive, (ii) reliant on, but not part of, the 
executive, and (iii) neither reliant on, nor part of, the executive. 
Of the four jurisdictions under review, only in Mainland China 
is the ombudsman function fulfilled by a government ministry with 
little or no attempt made to distance the performance of that func-
tion from the executive.  This system is not exclusive to Mainland 
China—in Japan, for example, the state ombudsman function is also 
performed by a branch of the executive, namely the Administrative 
Evaluation Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Commu-
nications.  Membership of the executive does not automatically 
erode the basis on which the ombudsman acts nor its effectiveness 
in monitoring public administration.  What matters are the implica-
tions of the ombudsman being part of the executive in the context of 
a specific system. 
In the context of Mainland China, a particular structural concern 
is the sharing or blurring of the ombudsman function between the 
MOS and the CCDI.  It is unclear whether the supervisory function 
is performed by a state institution proper or by the Party.  As noted, 
the practice is for the Minister of Supervision to also serve as Deputy 
Secretary of the CCDI and as Director of the NCPB.  The overlap of 
state and Party function and personnel is unsurprising considering 
the effective monopoly of the Party over state machinery, and the 
phenomenon of parallel state and Party competence is seen else-
                                                   
81 For a further discussion on effectiveness and transparency, see infra Section 
8. 
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where such as in the Central Military Commission and in local gov-
ernment.82  It could even be argued that, given the political realities 
of Mainland China, involvement of the Party machinery in admin-
istrative supervision might strengthen the ombudsman function. 
However, the effective merger of the MOS and CCDI subsidiar-
ies has been asymmetric across different local areas.83  In addition, 
structurally, the investment of the ombudsman function in a gov-
ernment ministry, the functions of which are not clearly distinguish-
able from those of a parallel Party body, does not inspire confidence 
that monitoring would be conducted independently of executive 
and political constraints.  It may well be designed in that way pre-
cisely to avoid the possibility of independent monitoring.  In reality, 
the CCDI may be the dominant supervisor, as has been suggested 
by other commentators,84 in which case the foundation of the MOS 
as the state ombudsman institution is eroded—yet the MOS is still 
designated by Mainland China as the national ombudsman.  There 
also seems to be a lack of clarity between the investigation channels 
of each body, which muddies the waters between administrative 
and political supervision.85 
The Ombudsman of Hong Kong and the CCAC of Macau fall 
into the second category:  they are reliant on, but not (formally) part 
of, the executive.  The Ombudsman is generally regarded as distinct 
from the legislature, executive, and judiciary; though, if one had to 
functionally align the institution with one of the branches of state, it 
would be the executive.  While she is appointed and removed by the 
Chief Executive for a renewable period of five years,86 it is provided 
                                                   
82 See, e.g., Susan V. Lawrence, China’s Political Institutions and Leaders in Charts, 
CONG. R. SERV. (Nov. 12, 2013) https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43303.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4857-KVZC] (report intended to assist in identifying “where 
political institutions and individuals fit within the broader Chinese political system 
and to identify which Chinese officials are responsible for specific portfolios”); see 
also WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA:  CASES AND MATERIALS 
121–24, 173–77 (2014) (outlining the organization of the Chinese Communist Party). 
83 See Randall Peerenboom, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 417 
(2002) (noting that some cities merged both personnel and workload, while others 
attempted to maintain some degree of separation).  This may be less of an issue if 
the Pilot Program resolves structural inconsistencies. 
84 See supra Section 2.1. 
85 See Larry C. Backer & Keren Wang, The Emerging Structures of Socialist Con-
stitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics: Extra-Judicial Detention and the Chinese Con-
stitutional Order, 23(2) PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 251, 281–84, 336–37 (2014) (pointing out 
that, in practice, the MOS and the CCDI are administered essentially by the same 
personnel). 
86 Ombudsman Ordinance (Hong Kong), §§ 3(3), (3A). 
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that the Ombudsman is not to be regarded as a servant or agent of 
the Government, or as enjoying any status, immunity, or privilege 
of the Government.87  In addition, the Ombudsman is prohibited 
from holding any other office of profit, or from engaging in any 
other occupation for reward, without the specific approval of the 
Chief Executive.88  She may resign from office at any time, or can be 
removed by the Chief Executive with the approval by resolution of 
the Legislative Council in the event of an inability to discharge the 
functions of her office or misbehavior.89 
Nevertheless, the Ombudsman is financially reliant on the exec-
utive, and must submit an annual report to the Chief Executive for 
tabling in the Legislative Council.90  This includes a statement of ac-
counts and an auditor’s report, which is made freely available on the 
internet for public scrutiny.  In practice, the Ombudsman is re-
garded as operating quite independently of the executive, and the 
anecdotal evidence is that she is not subject to political pressure.  
However, the institution remains reliant on the executive thus main-
taining a degree of structural proximity. 
The position is similar in Macau, where the Commissioner 
Against Corruption is appointed by the Central People’s Govern-
ment on the nomination of the Chief Executive,91 and is removed in 
the same way.92  Unlike for the Ombudsman of Hong Kong, there is 
no provision that the Commissioner must be unable to fulfil his du-
ties or have misbehaved prior to being removed from post.  How-
ever, he is suspended of his functions if he is served with a decision 
of indictment or a decision specifying a date for a trial hearing for 
the intentional commitment of a crime.93  He may resign from post 
by providing written notice to the Chief Executive.94  The Commis-
sioner may not engage in any other public or private activity, 
whether remunerated or not, nor may he hold any position in a trade 
union or political organization, without the authority of the Chief 
Executive where this would involve exercising a public function 
                                                   
87 Id. § 6B(1). 
88 Id. § 4. 
89 Id. § 3(4). 
90 Id. Sch. 1A, § 3(4).  Funding is appropriated by the Legislative Council, id. §§ 
3(6), 6(3); Sch. 1A, § 1. 
91 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 17. 
92 Id. art. 23(2). 
93 Id. art. 23(1). 
94 Id. art. 23(3). 
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contributing to the pursuit of the public interest.95 
A notable difference between the two Special Administrative Re-
gions is that the Macau Commissioner is formally appointed by the 
Central People’s Government of the PRC, whereas the Ombudsman 
of Hong Kong is formally appointed by the Chief Executive of Hong 
Kong.  However, it should be borne in mind that, in Macau, the om-
budsman and anti-corruption functions are vested in a single 
agency, whereas in Hong Kong the anti-corruption body is the sep-
arate ICAC (i.e., the Commissioner Against Corruption in Hong 
Kong).  Indeed, the head of the ICAC is, like his counterpart in Ma-
cau, appointed by the Central People’s Government on the nomina-
tion of the Chief Executive96—though he does not exercise the om-
budsman function. 
Another notable difference that supports the independence of 
the CCAC from the executive—at least formally—is that it is pro-
vided for in the Basic Law of Macau.  In particular, Article 59 of the 
Basic Law of Macau states that the CCAC “shall function inde-
pendently.”97  However, Article 59 also provides that the Commis-
sioner “shall be accountable to the Chief Executive.”98  Accordingly, 
despite its constitutional entrenchment, the CCAC is accountable to 
the Chief Executive in Macau even though executive agencies are 
essentially accountable to the CCAC in terms of their administrative 
standards and practices.  The CCAC must submit an annual report 
to the Chief Executive to be published in the Official Gazette of Ma-
cau99 and the report is also made available on the CCAC website.  
The CCAC’s income comes from the Government budget.100 
The Control Yuan is the most structurally independent from the 
executive of the four jurisdictions under review.  It is clearly not part 
of the executive, but an arm of the state in its own right under the 
quinquepartite structure of the Taiwanese constitution.101  It is also 
                                                   
95 Id. art. 18. 
96 Basic Law of Hong Kong art. 48(5). 
97 Basic Law of Macau art. 59; Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 2. 
98 Basic Law of Macau art. 59. 
99 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 15(1). 
100 Administrative Bylaw No. 3/2009, Organization and Operation of the Ser-
vice of the Commission against Corruption (Macau) art. 27, 
http://www.ccac.org.mo/index.php/en/about/related-laws?id=1247 
[https://perma.cc/Q4S7-K3MR]; Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 40. 
101 See Const. of the Republic of China, (Additional Articles) art. 7 (establishing 
the Control Yuan as an arm of the state with the power to impeach, censure, and 
audit other institutions); see also supra Section 2.4. 
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the most firmly entrenched in constitutional terms by Additional 
Article 7 of the ROC Constitution.  Members are nominated and ap-
pointed by the President of the ROC with the consent of the Legis-
lative Yuan, each member serving for a period of six years.102  They 
must have a demonstrated period of service in designated profes-
sions or areas of service.103  The move away from the previous sys-
tem, in which members were elected, at least signaled a move to-
ward a system where members could not be openly partisan.  
Indeed, members are required to be without party affiliation and to 
independently exercise their powers and discharge their responsi-
bilities in accordance with law.104  Nevertheless, appointments to the 
Control Yuan are not without political controversy.105 
Notwithstanding its structural independence, the Control Yuan 
budget still comes from the Government and is approved by the 
Legislative Yuan, thus it is not a completely autonomous institution.  
As noted, members of the Control Yuan are appointed by the Presi-
dent of the ROC (part of the executive, and not subject to the juris-
diction of the Control Yuan) with the consent of the Legislative 
Yuan, and unlawful acts of the Control Yuan are justiciable in the 
Judicial Yuan.  Therefore, taken as a whole, the Control Yuan is sub-
ject to the usual system of checks and balances.106 
It can therefore be seen that the ombudsman is part of the exec-
utive—and accountable to the ruling party—in Mainland China, but 
is to varying degrees separate from the executive, though not en-
tirely independent of it, in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.  The 
most structurally independent of the institutions is the Control Yuan 
of Taiwan. 
 
 
                                                   
102 Id. art. 7(2). 
103 Organic Law of the Control Yuan art. 3.1. 
104 Additional Articles art. 7(5). 
105 See e.g., Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Presidential Politics and the Judicial Facilitation of Di-
alogue Between Political Actors in New Asian Democracies: Comparing the South Korean 
and Taiwanese Experiences, 8(4) INT’L J. CONST. L. 911, 936 (2010) (recounting a signif-
icant legislative boycott in 2004 wherein President Chen’s nominations for Control 
Yuan commissioners were blocked by the KMT legislative majority for a year until 
the Constitutional Court ruled that the legislature must exercise its consent power 
in a timely manner). 
106 See CHANG ET AL., supra note 82, at 181–84. 
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7.  PROCESS AND SUBSTANTIVE POWERS 
 
There are similarities among the main aspects of institutional 
procedure.  Each of the ombudsmen under review can, for example, 
receive complaints from members of the public, private companies, 
and government bodies.  None of the institutions is first required to 
have complaints filtered by legislators (though a legislative filter 
was in place in Hong Kong until 1994), and all have broadly compa-
rable powers to obtain evidence and summon witnesses in the pro-
cess of their investigations.  Importantly, all are under a formal duty 
of secrecy or confidentiality in relation to the complainant.  All four 
institutions have the power to make their reports public, and all 
have internal procedures to review their own decisions. 
There are, however, some procedural differences between the 
institutions.  For instance, the Ombudsman of Hong Kong is the only 
institution that does not have the power to process anonymous com-
plaints.  In addition, whereas there is a specific provision that enacts 
a penalty for failure to cooperate with the investigations of the Om-
budsman or CCAC, there is no such provision for failure to cooper-
ate with the investigations of the MOS or the Control Yuan.  None 
of the four institutions’ decisions is subject to external review—un-
less there are grounds for alleging that the institutions themselves 
have acted unlawfully—though, in Mainland China, the decisions 
of lower supervisory organs are subject to external review by hier-
archically superior organs.  This does not, however, extend to the 
MOS itself, as it is the highest organ of supervision in the state. 
The substantive powers of the bodies under review bear signifi-
cant similarity based primarily on a power to make recommenda-
tions.  The Ombudsman, CCAC, and Control Yuan each have no 
power to award remedies and no power to impose penalties on in-
vestigated bodies or persons.  Both the Ombudsman and CCAC 
have no power to compel an investigated body to implement their 
respective recommendations, whilst the Control Yuan has an indi-
rect power to do so.  Though the MOS is not radically different in 
terms of its substantive powers, it has an indirect power to award 
remedies.  It also has the power to impose a penalty on an investi-
gated person and a partial power to impose a penalty on an investi-
gated body in the form of a notice of criticism. 
Dealing first with Mainland China, members of the public can 
submit a complaint to the MOS.  The Law on Administrative Super-
vision requires supervisory organs to institute a reporting system, 
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whereby citizens shall have the right to make accusations or exposi-
tions against any administrative organ or public servant, or any per-
sons appointed by state administrative organs, who are alleged to 
have violated rules of administrative discipline.107  In addition, com-
plaints can be made by legal persons (including companies) and 
“other organizations,” which would apparently include other gov-
ernment and public bodies.108  Following the 2010 amendment to the 
Law on Administrative Supervision, there is now express provision 
for the submission of anonymous complaints, and a duty of confi-
dentiality is placed on supervisory organs with regard to the rights, 
interests, and information relating to informants.109  Complaints can 
be submitted to the MOS by telephone, fax, e-mail, or the MOS web-
site. 
The MOS also conducts its own monitoring and inspection, and 
can perform investigations on that basis.  It even has staff working 
in other government departments to monitor their administration.110  
The MOS has been said to require approval from the Premier or Vice 
Premiers to investigate ministerial or provincial level officials, but is 
capable of initiating investigations of officials at the division or 
county level without such approval.111 
A case undergoes preliminary investigation, and can then be ac-
cepted for further investigation.112  The MOS has the power to obtain 
documents, accounts and other evidence, and to require depart-
ments and individuals under supervision to explain or clarify ques-
tions relevant to the supervision.113  It also has the power to order 
                                                   
107 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 6. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. art. 6, 46; Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Administrative Supervision, Adopted at the 63rd Executive 
Meeting of the State Council (Sept. 6, 2004) art. 3 [hereinafter Implementation Reg-
ulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China)], http://en.pku-
law.cn/display.aspx?cgid=55462&lib=law [https://perma.cc/J346-3XHL]. 
110 See Huang, supra note 21, at 836. 
111 Id., at 837. 
112 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 30–32; Imple-
mentation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) 
art. 29. 
113 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 19–20; Imple-
mentation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) 
art. 10. 
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departments and individuals under investigation not to sell or trans-
fer property relevant to the case.114  Administrative departments 
and authorities can be required to render assistance in the course of 
handling cases involving violation of laws and rules of administra-
tive discipline.115  Organizations and individuals within the jurisdic-
tion of the supervisory organ have no power to refuse to undergo 
supervision nor to obstruct supervisors in the performance of their 
official duties.116  Nevertheless, departments and persons under su-
pervision have a right to make representations in the course of an 
investigation.117  Cases found not to be within the jurisdiction of the 
supervisory organ are transferred to the body with authority to han-
dle them, and criminal cases are transferred to the relevant judicial 
body.118 
The MOS may decide that the allegations in a complaint are not 
adequately supported by facts or that the offence is minor, and ei-
ther close the case or subject the investigated party to “criticism” and 
“education.”119  If the MOS determines that there has been wrong-
doing meriting punishment,120 disciplinary proceedings begin.  
There can be a public hearing where the case is deemed sufficiently 
important, difficult, or complicated.121  In the case of public officials 
who are also Party members, there can also be a recommendation 
that a discipline inspection committee under the CCDI impose Party 
                                                   
114 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 20(2); Imple-
mentation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) 
arts. 12–13. 
115 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 22; Implementa-
tion Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 17–
20. 
116 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 13. 
117 Id. art. 34. 
118 Id. art. 44. 
119 Wedeman, supra note 20, at 904. 
120 See Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 5 (“In super-
vision, education shall be combined with punishment, and supervision and inspec-
tion shall be combined with system construction.”).  Prior to the 2010 amendment, 
there was no reference to “system construction.”  Cf. Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Administrative Supervision (adopted at the 25th Meeting of the Stand-
ing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress, May 9, 1997), 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=2b401469c8ac7f44&lib=law 
[https://perma.cc/QK9U-VB2B]. 
121 Asian Ombudsman Association, Fact Sheet: Ministry of Supervision, People’s 
Republic of China, 6 (2010) [hereinafter Asian Ombudsman Association (Mainland 
China)].   
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disciplinary sanctions, either in addition to, or instead of, adminis-
trative sanctions imposed under the MOS.122 
Supervisory decisions and recommendations must be conveyed 
in writing to the units or persons concerned.123  Administrative sanc-
tions include a warning, recording of demerit, recording of serious 
demerit, demotion, dismissal, or discharge.124  Major supervisory 
decisions and recommendations of subsidiary organs must be sub-
mitted to the level of government to which the supervisory organ 
belongs, and to the supervisory organ at the next highest level, for 
consent.  Major supervisory decisions and recommendations of the 
MOS must be submitted to the State Council for consent.125 
The MOS has the power to order departments and individuals 
to cease violating laws, rules, regulations, and rules of administra-
tive discipline,126 and to recommend suspension of duty to compe-
tent authorities for persons suspected of seriously violating rules of 
administrative discipline.127  A supervisory decision must be imple-
mented by the relevant departments and persons, whilst supervi-
sory recommendations must be adopted unless there are justifiable 
reasons not to do so.128  Corrective recommendations can be made 
                                                   
122 See Wedeman, supra note 20, at 904. 
123 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 36. 
124 Id. art. 24(1); see also Law of the People’s Republic of China on Public Serv-
ants (adopted at the 15th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National 
People’s Congress, Apr. 27, 2005) art. 56, http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws_reg-
ulations/2014/08/23/content_281474983042347.htm [https://perma.cc/D6BT-
2PS2] (“[D]isciplinary actions include: warning, recording of a demerit, recording 
of a serious demerit, demotion, removal from office and discharge from public em-
ployment.”). 
125 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 35.  “Major” de-
cisions and recommendations are purportedly defined in the Implementation Reg-
ulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 37 as those 
dealing with “consequential matters for inspection and handling consequential or 
complicated cases.”  Definitions of these terms could potentially be found in the 
Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland 
China) arts. 28, 30, though they refer to different sections of the Law on Adminis-
trative Supervision. 
126 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 19(3); Imple-
mentation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) 
art. 19(3). 
127 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 20(4); Imple-
mentation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) 
art. 20(4). 
128 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 25, 36; Imple-
mentation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) 
art. 25. 
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in a wide variety of situations, including where a party refuses to 
enforce laws or rules; where decisions, decrees, or instructions 
should be modified or revoked; where the interests of the state, col-
lective, or citizen are impaired and remedial measures need to be 
taken; where a party is ordered to make an open apology, cease to 
perform their duties to accept inspection, resign, or be dismissed; in 
“other situations wherein efforts shall be made to improve a diligent 
and clean government system”; and “other situations for which a 
supervisory recommendation is needed.”129  A notice of criticism can 
also be circulated against departments or persons who violate pro-
visions of the Law on Administrative Supervision.130  The MOS does 
not appear to have the power to award remedies directly, but 
through its recommendations can stipulate “remedial measures” 
which include elimination of ill effects, rehabilitation of reputation, 
extension of apology, and compensation for loss.131 
A person aggrieved by the decision of a supervisory organ may 
seek review by that organ, and then by the next highest supervisory 
organ.132  The reviewing organ may hold a hearing and may make 
its decision public.133  A higher supervisory organ reviewing such a 
decision or recommendation may modify or revoke the decision, or 
recommend to the lower supervisory organ to modify or revoke it.134  
There is, however, no option for higher review of decisions and rec-
ommendations of the MOS, as it is the most senior supervisory or-
gan in the state apparatus; nor does the MOS have the power to re-
view decisions taken by supervisory organs at the county level, as 
these are subject to review at the provincial level (though decisions 
of supervisory organs at the provincial level are subject to review by 
the MOS).135 
In Hong Kong, there are two ways in which an investigation can 
be initiated by the Ombudsman.  The first is upon the receipt of a 
complaint from a natural or legal person.136  Complaints may be 
                                                   
129 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 23. 
130 Id. art. 45. 
131 Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Main-
land China) art. 23. 
132 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 38, 40; Imple-
mentation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) 
art. 39. 
133 Asian Ombudsman Association (Mainland China), supra note 121, 6. 
134 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) arts. 39, 41. 
135 Id. art. 42. 
136 The Ombudsman Ordinance (Hong Kong), § 7(1). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
 
466 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:2 
made via an online complaint form, post, telephone, or in person.  
They cannot be made anonymously.137  The Ombudsman has discre-
tion on whether to fully investigate a complaint138 and can continue 
or discontinue an investigation even if the complainant withdraws 
the complaint.139  The second way in which an investigation can be 
initiated is on the Ombudsman’s own motion by way of a “direct 
investigation.”140 
The Ombudsman has the power to regulate procedure as she 
thinks fit, and has the power to obtain information and documents, 
and to make such inquiries, as she thinks fit.141  She also has the 
power to obtain evidence and summon witnesses.142  There is signif-
icant flexibility in terms of formal procedural requirements, but in 
practice investigations are conducted by a specific team, each with 
one or more areas of specialization and each headed by a Chief In-
vestigation Officer.  More senior staff, including the Deputy Om-
budsman or Assistant Ombudsmen, may become involved in diffi-
cult or complex cases.  Staff and advisers of the Ombudsman are 
under a duty of secrecy in relation to matters arising from any in-
vestigation or complaint, and coming to their actual knowledge in 
the exercise of their functions.  However, this is qualified by permit-
ting disclosure of relevant matters in the course of proceedings for 
an offense under the Ombudsman Ordinance, reporting evidence of 
any crime to such authority as they consider appropriate, and dis-
closing to a person any matter which is necessary to be disclosed for 
the purposes of investigating a complaint or deciding whether an 
investigation should be undertaken, continued, or discontinued.143  
It may be noted that a duty of secrecy potentially sets a higher stand-
ard than a duty of confidentiality.  Proceedings are almost always 
conducted without a hearing, though the Ombudsman has the 
power to hold a hearing if she thinks fit to do so.144 
At the conclusion of an investigation, the Ombudsman may sub-
mit a report to the head of the affected organization.  The report may 
recommend that a particular remedy be given to the complainant or 
                                                   
137 Id. § 10(1)(b). 
138 Id. § 9. 
139 Id. § 11. 
140 Id. § 7(1). 
141 Id. § 12(3). 
142 Id. § 13. 
143 Id. § 15. 
144 Id. § 12(5). 
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may make other recommendations.145  For example, it might be rec-
ommended that policies, procedures, or practices are modified to 
avoid maladministration in the future.  It might be recommended 
that additional training is given to staff or that targets or objectives 
are set.  In certain circumstances, the Ombudsman may submit the 
report and recommendations to the Chief Executive.146  If the Om-
budsman considers that a serious irregularity or injustice has oc-
curred, she may make a report to the Chief Executive which must 
thereafter be laid before the Legislative Council.147  This offers an 
avenue for political accountability in the event of serious irregular-
ity or injustice related to maladministration. 
Importantly, however, the Ombudsman has no power to grant a 
remedy or to compel an investigated body to implement any 
changes.  In principle, the head of the investigated organization can 
ignore her recommendations.  In addition to the possibility of polit-
ical accountability outlined above, however, the Ombudsman can 
publish a report on an investigation (without disclosing the identity 
of individuals) which affords the public an opportunity to learn of 
instances of maladministration and consequent findings.  As such, 
it may not always be easy for recommendations to be ignored by the 
head of the investigated organization as there is an avenue for both 
executive and public scrutiny. 
In addition to the Ombudsman’s power of investigation, her of-
fice can address a complaint by way of mediation where the parties 
so agree and where the maladministration is not serious.148  In prac-
tice, there is also the option of initiating an “internal complaint han-
dling” mechanism whereby, with the complainant’s consent, the 
Ombudsman refers the complaint to an organization for investiga-
tion and direct reply to the complainant.149 
There is no power of external merits review of the Ombuds-
man’s determinations.  A request for review can be submitted by a 
disappointed complainant, but this is processed internally and will 
                                                   
145 Id. § 16(1). 
146 Id. § 16(1)–(3). 
147 Id. § 16(5)–(6). 
148 Id. § 11B; see also Asian Ombudsman Association, Fact Sheet: Ombudsman of 
Hong Kong, 3 (2010) [hereinafter Asian Ombudsman Association (Hong Kong)], 
http://ofomb.ombudsman.hk/doc/yr22/pdf/en/2010_E_Ombudsman%20Re-
view.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2U3-MCKU]. 
149 Asian Ombudsman Association (Hong Kong), 3. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
 
468 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:2 
not necessarily result in modification of the original decision.  Sta-
tistics show that the original decision is varied only in a small per-
centage of requests for review;150 however, this is not necessarily in-
dicative of deficiency in the review process of the Ombudsman.  The 
same statistics disclose that only a very small percentage of com-
plainants seek a request for review.  There can be a range of reasons 
for this, including satisfaction with the original decision, insufficient 
confidence in the likelihood of successful review, and being una-
ware that review can be requested.  If the Ombudsman acts unlaw-
fully, her decision or conduct is of course susceptible to judicial re-
view. 
In Macau, members of the public can submit complaints to the 
CCAC by telephone, fax, e-mail, post, or in person.151  The CCAC 
also has the power to initiate its own investigations.  When a com-
plaint is received, it undergoes preliminary analysis.  If categorized 
as showing signs of corruption, it is allocated for preliminary inves-
tigation by the Anti-Corruption Bureau and is thereafter subject to a 
full investigation or filed as not fit for investigation.  At the conclu-
sion of a full investigation, the case is referred to the Public Prosecu-
tions Office or filed on the basis of insufficient evidence. 
If showing signs of administrative deficiency, a case is allocated 
for preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman Bureau.  Again, if 
not fit for investigation, it is filed.  Otherwise, there are three ways 
in which the case can be handled.  First, it can be formally investi-
gated.  Second, if there is no sign of any violation of law and it is 
deemed more appropriate for another body to handle the case, the 
CCAC will refer it to the body concerned and follow up on progress, 
provided that the complainant’s consent is secured.152  Third, where 
the case is deemed properly to be subject to administrative or judi-
cial remedies, the CCAC may refer the parties to the relevant bod-
ies.153  The CCAC has the discretion to close proceedings where the 
                                                   
150 See THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ADMINISTRATION WING, CHIEF 
SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION’S OFFICE, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL BRIEFING PAPER (LC 
PAPER NO. CB(4)513/12-13(01)): ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT MECHANISM TO 
REVIEW THE DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/panels/ajls/papers/aj0326cb4-513-1-
e.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE4H-KSCA] (citing statistics for requests for review re-
ceived, and reviews conducted, from 2009 through Feb. 28, 2013). 
151 Asian Ombudsman Association (Macau), supra note 73, at 6. 
152 Id., at 5. 
153 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 13. 
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facts lie beyond its jurisdiction or where there is insufficient evi-
dence to support the investigation.154 
The Commissioner Against Corruption, deputy commissioners, 
and certain other staff have free access to all places of work of the 
Administration of Macau.155  The Commissioner and his deputy 
commissioners enjoy the status of a criminal police authority in re-
lation to penal procedure acts within their powers,156 and in criminal 
inquiries, CCAC staff may be authorized by the Commissioner to 
carry and use weapons of a type and caliber approved by decision 
of the Chief Executive of Macau.157  The CCAC is empowered to ex-
amine documents, conduct inquiries, and obtain testimony, and 
bodies under investigation are required to comply with timeframes 
stipulated by the CCAC in this regard.158  All natural and legal per-
sons are required to cooperate with the CCAC,159 and public entities 
within the scope of the CCAC’s jurisdiction are required to cooper-
ate and to carry out such investigations, inquiries, and other 
measures as necessary.160  A person who refuses to testify to the 
CCAC or who fails to do so without justification, or who intention-
ally and unjustifiably obstructs the performance of the CCAC’s du-
ties, is liable to be subject to the criminal penalty for disobedience.161  
There is a duty of confidentiality in relation to the CCAC’s handling 
of the facts of cases.162 
The CCAC is under a duty to communicate a final decision to 
the party requesting its intervention.163  Upon the completion of an 
investigation, it may report any findings of illegal acts to the rele-
vant authorities.164  Recommendations can be made directly to the 
authorities where illegal or unfair administrative acts or procedures 
are identified.165  The Commissioner Against Corruption is neither 
civilly nor criminally liable for a recommendation or preparatory 
                                                   
154 Id. art. 12(3). 
155 Id. art. 35. 
156 Id. art. 11(3). 
157 Id. art. 36(1). 
158 Id. arts. 4(2)–(4), 6(2), 12(2). 
159 Id. art. 5. 
160 Id. art. 6(1). 
161 Id. art. 14. 
162 Id. arts. 20, 26. 
163 Id. art. 12(4). 
164 Id. art. 4(6). 
165 Id. art. 4(12). 
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acts leading toward a recommendation.166  If the investigated entity 
does not fully accept recommendations made by the CCAC, it must 
give its reasoned reply within a specified period of time.167  The 
CCAC must then decide whether the partial or non-acceptance of its 
recommendations is justified; if not, it may pass the case to the hier-
archical superior or the supervisory entity of the investigated body 
and, once the hierarchical chain has been exhausted, it must inform 
the Chief Executive of Macau.168  It may also inquire into the pro-
gress of any criminal or disciplinary proceedings filed with the rel-
evant authorities.169  In terms of review mechanisms for the disap-
pointed complainant, the CCAC will not reexamine or give further 
response to a complaint on which a decision has been made, unless 
sufficiently substantial further evidence has been provided by the 
complainant.170 
The CCAC may report on the results of its investigations to the 
Chief Executive.171  It can also make recommendations on the inter-
pretation, amendment, or repeal of legislation, or recommend new 
legislation where it considers that there are deficiencies in existing 
legal provisions with regard to the rights, freedoms, safeguards, or 
legitimate interests of individuals.172  Further, it can make recom-
mendations to the Chief Executive for the introduction of new 
measures to combat corruption and illicit or unethical practices, and 
to improve public administration.173  There is a Monitoring Commit-
tee on the Discipline of CCAC Personnel comprising a president and 
four members, appointed by the Chief Executive, which receives 
complaints about CCAC personnel.174 
Finally, in Taiwan, investigations are either assigned to mem-
bers of the Control Yuan upon receipt of a complaint, initiated by 
such members, or commissioned by the Control Yuan and entrusted 
to a related organization for investigation.175  The process for receiv-
                                                   
166 Id. art. 22. 
167 Id. art. 12(5). 
168 Id. art. 12(6). 
169 Id. art. 4(7). 
170 Asian Ombudsman Association (Macau), supra note 73, at 6. 
171 Organic Law of CCAC (Macau) art. 4(8). 
172 Id. art. 4(9). 
173 Id. art. 4(10), (11). 
174 Id. art. 38(3). 
175 See CONTROL YUAN, Our Powers: Why and How Does the Control Yuan Exercise 
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ing and handling written complaints is set out in regulations en-
acted by the Control Yuan.  It has the power to receive complaints 
from the public and from agencies and organizations, in addition to 
the power of Control Yuan members to initiate investigations.176  
Complaints can be lodged by post, fax, via the Control Yuan web-
site, in person at the Control Yuan, or in person to Control Yuan 
members when they are on a circuit supervision trip—members of 
the Control Yuan not only inspect the central authorities, but also 
local authorities through circuit supervision trips.177  Each member 
of the Control Yuan is expected to visit a different location in Taiwan 
each quarter of the year. 
Upon the receipt of a complaint in relation to which there are no 
existing cases, the complaint is dealt with by a member of the Con-
trol Yuan.  If the member approves the request, the case is forwarded 
to a relevant committee.178  Complaints are dismissed if they are be-
yond the powers and jurisdiction of the Control Yuan, require a law-
suit to be filed against a judicial agency or court martial, or require 
the issuing of a petition, appeal or administrative litigation.179  A 
complaint will not be investigated where it has been submitted to 
administrative remedial procedures, judicial proceedings, or a 
higher or responsible agency for handling, unless the defendant is 
alleged to have committed malfeasance or serious misconduct.180  
The Control Yuan can, but usually does not, investigate a case pend-
ing in a court of law.181  It is possible for a complaint to be submitted 
                                                   
the Power of Investigation?, 
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7764&ctNode=1825&mp=21 
[https://perma.cc/3MW4-3EDJ] (explaining the investigative structure of the Con-
trol Yuan). 
176 Control Act (Taiwan) art. 4; Regulations for Receiving and Handling Peo-
ple’s Written Complaints (Control Yuan) (enacted by the 22nd Control Yuan ple-
nary meeting, 20 July 1948, amended 1955-1998) art. 3 [hereinafter Complaint Reg-
ulations (Taiwan)]. 
177 Ger, supra note 28, at 36. 
178 See Complaint Regulations (Taiwan) art. 9 (establishing the system for pro-
cessing people’s written complaints). 
179 Id. art. 11. 
180 Id. art. 12. 
181 See CONTROL YUAN, Our Powers:  Can the Control Yuan Investigate Cases Pend-
ing in a Law Court?, 
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7766&ctNode=1825&mp=21 
[https://perma.cc/48TK-AB2Q] (last visited Nov. 28, 2017) (describing circum-
stances in which the Control Yuan can investigate cases pending in a court of law). 
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anonymously, but no investigation will be made on such a com-
plaint unless the defendant is alleged to have committed malfea-
sance or serious misconduct.182  If an investigation is made on the 
basis of an anonymous complaint, no reply is issued by the Control 
Yuan following processing of the complaint.183  No replies are issued 
where the complaint is similar to others lodged by the same com-
plainant in a short period of time, or where the complaint includes 
empty, absurd, or insulting remarks.184  The Control Yuan has the 
power to investigate and obtain files, records and documents, and 
may summon the complainant and the investigated person for ques-
tioning.185 
The powers of the Control Yuan comprise impeachment, cen-
sure, and the proposal of corrective measures—in addition to the 
power of audit which is beyond the scope of this Article.  Impeach-
ment proceedings are required to be initiated by two or more mem-
bers of the Control Yuan, and investigated and voted upon by a 
committee of not less than nine members.186  If nine or more mem-
bers, excluding the initiators of the case, conclude for a determina-
tion of impeachment, the case is turned over to a competent disci-
plinary organ for action,187 typically the Commission on the 
Disciplinary Sanctions of Functionaries (“CDSF”) of the Judicial 
Yuan.  Proceedings of impeachment are not disclosed to the public 
if and until the case is turned over to the competent disciplinary or-
gan.188  At the same time as the case is transferred, the Control Yuan 
announces its motion of impeachment in a press release and pub-
lishes it in the Control Yuan bulletin.189 
Where the Control Yuan considers a violation of law or derelic-
tion of duty in an impeachment case to be sufficiently serious as to 
require immediate remedy, it can require the offender’s superior to 
                                                   
182 Complaint Regulations (Taiwan) art. 12. 
183 Id. art. 13. 
184 Id. 
185 Control Act (Taiwan) arts. 26–27. 
186 Zhonghua Minguo Xianfa (Constitution of the Republic of China) Addi-
tional Articles art. 7(3) (1947). 
187 Control Act (Taiwan) art. 8; Enforcement Rules of the Control Act 
(amended 11 February 2009) art. 10. 
188 Control Act (Taiwan) art. 13. 
189 Enforcement Rules of the Control Act art. 10(2). 
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take immediate remedial action.190  Where it considers that an im-
peached public functionary has violated criminal or military law, it 
is required to turn the case over to the relevant disciplinary organ 
and a competent court or court martial.191  A competent organ or 
court to which an impeachment case has been transferred is re-
quired to take immediate action.192 
The potential consequences of impeachment are discharge, sus-
pension, degradation, salary cut, demerit and admonition.193  Im-
portantly, the Control Yuan does not have the power to impose dis-
ciplinary sanctions194—it has the power of impeachment, but 
disciplinary power resides in the relevant disciplinary organ, 
namely the CDSF.  This is in line with Article 77 of the ROC Consti-
tution which states that the Judicial Yuan shall have jurisdiction 
over cases concerning disciplinary measures against public func-
tionaries. 
If a member of the Control Yuan considers a public functionary 
to be guilty of violation of law or dereliction of duty which requires 
suspension of duty or urgent remedy, he may submit a written cen-
sure to be examined and determined by three or more members.  A 
censure is forwarded to the superior of the functionary or, if the case 
involves a violation of criminal or military law, to the competent 
court or court martial.195  A censure which reaches the superior of 
the functionary may result in suspension of the functionary from 
duty.196  If the superior considers that no action should be taken, he 
is required to submit his justifications to the Control Yuan,197 though 
if found by two members of the Control Yuan to have taken inap-
propriate action, the superior himself may face impeachment.198  As 
with impeachment, proceedings of censure are not disclosed to the 
public if and until the case is turned over to a competent disciplinary 
                                                   
190 Control Act (Taiwan) art. 14. 
191 Id. art. 15. 
192 Id. art. 16. 
193 See CONTROL YUAN, Our Powers: What are the Differences Among the Powers of 
Impeachment, Censure, and Corrective Measures?, 
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7785&ctNode=1825&mp=21 
[https://perma.cc/UH4B-ANDP] (last visited Nov. 28, 2017) (differentiating the 
powers of impeachment, censure and corrective measures). 
194 Ma, supra note 29, at 426. 
195 Control Act (Taiwan) art. 19. 
196 Id. art. 21. 
197 Id. art. 22. 
198 Id. 
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organ.199  Also as with impeachment, a competent organ or court to 
which a censure case has been transferred is required to take imme-
diate action.200  A potential consequence of censure is suspension 
from duty or other immediate action.201 
The Control Yuan has the power to propose corrective measures 
to the Executive Yuan and its subordinate organs.202  Other Yuans 
and the office of the President do not fall under the scope of this 
power, thus it to some extent embodies the Control Yuan’s ombuds-
man functions proper.  Upon receipt of corrective measures, the 
body in question is required to make improvements immediately or 
take other appropriate action, and inform the Control Yuan in writ-
ing on those improvements or actions.  If no reply is received within 
two months, the Control Yuan may inquire of the organ in ques-
tion.203  If the organ refuses to reply or gives an unsatisfactory expla-
nation, the Control Yuan can initiate a case of impeachment or cen-
sure against the head of the organization in question.204  Whilst it 
therefore cannot directly compel the Executive Yuan or its subsidi-
ary organs to implement recommendations, the possibility of im-
peachment or censure of the head of the organization under review 
incentivizes compliance. 
Should a complainant disagree with the decision of a member of 
the Control Yuan, he may request, but is not entitled to, reinvestiga-
tion.  There is provision for internal review of Control Yuan deci-
sions insofar as an impeachment case that is not approved can be 
requested for review by the proposing members, in which case it is 
transferred to a new committee comprising 9-13 members for final 
decision.205 
 
                                                   
199 Id. art. 23. 
200 Id. 
201 CONTROL YUAN, Our Powers: What are the Differences Among the Powers of Im-
peachment, Censure, and Corrective Measures?, 
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7785&ctNode=1825&mp=21 
[https://perma.cc/UH4B-ANDP] (last visited Nov. 28, 2017). 
202 Control Act (Taiwan) arts. 1–2, 24. 
203 Id. art. 25. 
204 See CONTROL YUAN, Our Powers: What Should an Organization do After Receiv-
ing a Case of Corrective Measures Proposed by the Control Yuan?, 
http://www.cy.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=7763&ctNode=1825&mp=21 
[https://perma.cc/4AH4-LMQB] (last visited Nov. 28, 2017) (describing the conse-
quences of failure to properly address a corrective measure). 
205 Ger, supra note 28, at 24. 
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8.  EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY 
 
Institutional effectiveness is not easy to measure, less still when 
comparing jurisdictions where the institutions under evaluation 
serve varying purposes and operate within considerably different 
legal, constitutional, political, and social contexts.  Public confidence 
in the institution may be an indicator that it is fulfilling its function 
with a degree of success.  However, this is difficult to measure.206  
Short of an extensive and wide-ranging empirical study across the 
four jurisdictions, beyond the scope of this research,207 the best indi-
cators of effectiveness and transparency come with a contextual 
comparison of the extent to which formal legal frameworks create a 
suitable environment for promoting robust standards of public ad-
ministration, and whether stated objectives appear to be met. 
Structurally, the situation in Mainland China is a cause for con-
cern.  It has been pointed out that supervisory organs subsidiary to 
the MOS are part of the local governments which they monitor.  In 
addition, the heads of the local branches of the MOS and CCDI are 
equivalent to or lower in rank than the heads of local governments 
or their subordinate bureaus.208  This means that, even though there 
is the possibility of seeking review from the supervisory organ im-
mediately above that whose decision is being challenged, there 
might be insufficient incentives for the original supervisory organ to 
rigorously monitor departments and persons within their jurisdic-
tion, or to properly process complaints received about such depart-
ments and persons.  Deserving cases might therefore never have the 
possibility of reaching the more senior supervisory organ, including 
the MOS itself. 
                                                   
206 See e.g., Brenda Danet, Toward A Method To Evaluate The Ombudsman Role, 10 
ADMINISTRATION & SOC’Y 335–70 (1978) (providing background literature on the as-
sessment of ombudsman effectiveness); S. E. Aufrecht and M. Hertogh, Evaluating 
Ombudsman Systems, in RIGHTING WRONGS: THE OMBUDSMAN IN SIX CONTINENTS 389-
402 (Roy Gregory and Philip Giddings eds., 2000) (background on the ombuds-
man); Anita Stuhmcke, Evaluating Ombudsman: A Case Study in Developing a Quanti-
tative Methodology to Measure the Performance of the Ombudsman, 10 THE INT. 
OMBUDSMAN YEARBOOK 23-82 (2006) (discussing quantitative methodology for 
measuring ombudsman performance). 
207 An empirical study of ombudsman institutions in Greater China would be 
useful, but particularly challenging in Mainland China given informational and 
transparency deficits. 
208 Huang, supra note 21, at 842. 
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In addition, supervisory organs must submit reports on the re-
sults of inspections to the level of government to which they belong, 
or to the supervisory organ at a higher level.209  This has been cited 
as a factor negatively affecting the effectiveness of the Mainland 
Chinese supervisory organs in limiting maladministration, in addi-
tion to understaffing of supervisory organs, a lack of sufficient 
power to impose sanctions, dependence on government funding, 
and the incapability of dealing with high-level corruption.210  Gov-
ernmental consent can also be required for administrative sanctions 
to take effect,211 undermining the independence of supervisory or-
gans. 
These weaknesses in the structural design of the MOS and the 
broader supervisory system can translate into limited effectiveness.  
However, even where formal rules and institutions seem well de-
signed, there remains the possibility for divergence between those 
rules and institutions, and actual practice.  Mainland China’s com-
parative lack of transparency accentuates this possibility.  As an ex-
ample, persons assisting the charging or provision of information 
against serious violations of laws or rules of administrative disci-
pline can be rewarded by the MOS.212  In addition, administrative 
sanctions are due to be imposed on any person who retaliates 
against a complainant, accuser, exposer or supervisor, with the po-
tential for criminal responsibility.213  On the face of it, these rules 
incentivize formal reporting by complainants or persons assisting 
investigations, and disincentivize reprisal by the authorities. 
Nevertheless, challenges remain in Mainland China in terms of 
complainants’ fear of retaliation.214  This has been documented in 
relation to another channel for persons to express grievances about 
public officers and the conduct of public administration, namely the 
                                                   
209 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 30(3); Imple-
mentation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) 
art. 28. 
210 PEERENBOOM, supra note 83, at 416–17. 
211 Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Main-
land China) art. 24. 
212 Id. art. 3; Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (Mainland China) art. 
8. 
213 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 47; Police Law 
(Mainland China) art. 46; Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (Mainland 
China). 
214 Yong, supra note 19, at 17–18. 
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system of complaint letters and visits.215  The effectiveness of this 
system has been questioned by allegations of arbitrariness216 and hu-
man rights violations.217  Indeed, similar allegations have been made 
of the CCDI interrogation system, though it has been suggested that 
there may recently have been some improvement in that system, 
and that it may—notwithstanding the controversial techniques em-
ployed, and in utilitarian terms—be an effective anti-corruption 
mechanism.218  However, since the 2010 amendment to the Law on 
Administrative Supervision, there is express provision for the sub-
mission of anonymous complaints,219 though there is no data to at-
test to the practical effectiveness of this provision.  A duty of confi-
dentiality has also been imposed on supervisory organs with regard 
to the rights, interests, and information relating to informants,220 and 
provisions are in place to support the impartiality of supervisors.221  
It should also be noted that there have been formal steps taken in 
Mainland China to improve transparency and access to information 
in public administration, as with the introduction of regulations on 
the disclosure of government information in 2007.222 
The potential for misalignment between formal rules and insti-
tutions on the one hand, and actual practice on the other, was rec-
ognized by Huang Yasheng.  It was, however, argued that it is still 
                                                   
215 See Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (Mainland China).  See gen-
erally Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 103 (2006) (arguing that the xinfang system is fundamentally a mul-
tipurpose tool of governance, rather than an institution of particularized justice 
based on legal norms). 
216 Thornton, supra note 65, at 14. 
217 Human Rights Watch (Sophie Richardson ed.), An Alleyway in Hell: China’s 
Abusive Black Jails (Nov. 12, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/11/12/al-
leyway-hell/chinas-abusive-black-jails [https://perma.cc/KH8A-R8R2]. 
218 See Dui Hua Foundation, Corruption, Shuanggui and Rule of Law (June 27, 
2013), http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2013/06/corruption-shuanggui-and-
rule-of-law.html [https://perma.cc/6F8J-AYVM] (describing shuanggui and signs 
of efforts to bring it under the rule of law); See also CCDI & MOS, Notice on Several 
Questions Regarding the use of Liangzhi and Shuanggui Measures by Discipline Inspection 
and Supervision Organs (June 5, 1998). 
219 Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 6. 
220 Id. arts. 6, 46. 
221 Id. art. 14; Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervi-
sion (Mainland China) art. 33. 
222 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of Govern-
ment Information (promulgated by the State Council, May 1, 2008) The China Cen-
ter, Yale Law School, February 2009, https://law.yale.edu/system/files/docu-
ments/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-OGI-Regs-English.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KN8L-8BBE]. 
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important to examine formal rules and institutions because, first, 
formal institutions often give rise to incentives and condition behav-
ior, and second, the central administration appears to adjust institu-
tional design to overcome problems or achieve political objectives.223  
That justifies an examination of the formal machinery for adminis-
trative supervision even if there is the possibility for divergence 
from actual practice.  In addition, as this Article aims to a compare 
and contrast the ombudsman machinery in each of the Greater Chi-
nese jurisdictions, a finding may well be that there is in Mainland 
China the greatest potential for misalignment between formal insti-
tutions and actual practice in administrative supervision.  That 
would of course count as a weakness of the system relative to the 
other systems under review. 
Some indication of institutional effectiveness can be drawn from 
published statistics, though this is dependent on the credibility and 
methodology of the body compiling the statistics and the selection 
of statistics made available.  The MOS publishes limited statistics on 
its investigation activities, but without significant elaboration on the 
number and type of complaints received.224  Reports on individual 
cases are made available on the MOS website, but these tend to be 
short and appear to be selective.225  This is again an indictment on 
its transparency. 
The most recently available Annual Report published by the 
Ombudsman of Hong Kong, spanning April 2016 to March 2017, re-
ported that for the year under review 4,862 complaints were re-
ceived, slightly lower than previous annual figures.  Of those com-
plaints, 2,556 were concluded by inquiry, 218 by investigation and 
133 by mediation.  1,102 cases were closed on the basis of insufficient 
grounds, and 965 were closed on the basis that the Ombudsman was 
legally bound to do so, including absence of jurisdiction.  The top 
five organizations complained against, where the Ombudsman pur-
sued cases to conclusion, were the Food and Environmental Hy-
giene Department (476), Housing Department (456), Buildings De-
partment (216), Lands Department (207) and Transport Department 
                                                   
223 Huang, supra note 21, at 840-41.  The Pilot Program may also be considered 
in this context. 
224 See Ministry of Supervision, 2016 Annual Report on Information Disclosure 
(Apr. 11, 2017), 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/xxgknb/201704/t20170411_97156.html 
[https://perma.cc/4HMC-KJLP] (describing activities of the MOS in 2016). 
225 See Disciplinary Review, http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/jlsc/ 
[https://perma.cc/GSZ6-GLLY]. 
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(171).  Of all cases concluded by way of full investigation, 60.5% 
were found unsubstantiated, 22.5% partly substantiated (an increase 
of over nine percentage points), 11.0% substantiated, 5.5% unsub-
stantiated but other inadequacies found, and 0.5% withdrawn or 
discontinued.  The top five forms of maladministration substanti-
ated by a full investigation were error, wrong advice or decision 
(27.4%), ineffective control (19.5%), delay or inaction (16.8%), faulty 
procedures (14.2%) and lack of response to complainant/enquirer 
(7.1%).  Eleven direct investigations were completed, examining a 
range of issues including tree management, the Marine Depart-
ment’s follow-up mechanism on recommendations made in Marine 
Incident Investigation Reports, temporary closure of public swim-
ming pools and beaches due to lifeguard shortages, and regulation 
of kindergarten application fees.226 
Limited data is published by the Ombudsman on the compliance 
rate by public bodies with her recommendations.  For the year under 
review, the Ombudsman made a total of 254 recommendations, of 
which 83.1% were accepted for implementation—almost identical to 
figures for the previous year—and 16.9% were still under consider-
ation by the end of the audit period.227  This ostensibly means that 
no recommendations were rejected for implementation.  In addition, 
133 cases were settled through mediation, similar to the two previ-
ous years, though a sharp increase on three years previously.228  It 
should be emphasized that it is technically open to an investigated 
body to decline to implement the Ombudsman’s recommendations.  
However, whether in the spirit of pursuing good administrative 
practice, for fear of political or reputational consequences (such as 
in reports forwarded by the Ombudsman to the Chief Executive, 
those laid before the Legislative Council, or those on which the me-
dia reports),229 the Ombudsman has secured a very high rate of com-
pliance with her recommendations. 
                                                   
226 The Ombudsman, Hong Kong, ANNUAL REPORT: MAINTAINING IMPARTIALITY 
WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOUR (2017), http://ofomb.ombudsman.hk/doc/yr29/en/mo-
bile/index.html [https://perma.cc/D2PN-CV33]. 
227 Id. at 25. 
228 Id. at 28. 
229 It is conceivable that legal consequences could result in circumstances in 
which an investigated body ignored recommendations in relation to a particular 
case of maladministration, and the same form of maladministration arises again in 
a manner which is unlawful.  There is a possibility of arguing in an application for 
judicial review that the body, in failing to take into account the Ombudsman’s rec-
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The available data would suggest that the Ombudsman is an ef-
fective form of administrative supervision in Hong Kong, though 
two caveats are worth noting.  First, these figures are provided by 
the Ombudsman and their veracity and accuracy is dependent on 
honest and transparent reporting.  Second, subsequent annual re-
ports do not disclose whether and to what extent the recommenda-
tions still under consideration by the end of the preceding audit pe-
riod were accepted for implementation.  Accordingly, for the period 
from April 2016 to March 2017, the outstanding 16.9% of recommen-
dations which had yet to be accepted for implementation could have 
been wholly or partly rejected (or accepted) following the conclu-
sion of the relevant audit period. 
The most recently published Annual Report of the CCAC of Ma-
cau is for 2016.  Overall, 839 complaints were received from the pub-
lic (almost a 10% increase on the previous year, and of which 411 
were made anonymously or with a request for anonymity), 29 cases 
were initiated by the CCAC on its own motion (a 190% increase on 
the previous year), 19 were investigated at the request of overseas 
authorities (a 375% increase on the previous year), and 23 were re-
ferred to the CCAC by other public bodies (over 53% increase on the 
previous year).  In terms of its ombudswork, 658 complaints were 
received.  Of those, the top five areas to which complaints referred 
were systems relating to public service positions (186), meteorolog-
ical analysis (80), traffic affairs (42), municipal affairs (40) and disci-
plined services management and their law enforcement (37).  Thirty 
complaints were determined to be beyond the competency of the 
CCAC.  The anti-corruption arm of the CCAC received 252 criminal 
cases qualifying for handling, and concluded 182 cases.  The Annual 
Report also stated that twelve cases investigated by the CCAC had 
been adjudicated in court in 2016, mostly involving corruption, 
fraud, forgery, breach of confidentiality, or abuse of power.  The 
cases resulted in a mixture of verdicts including imprisonment for 
periods ranging from six months to twelve years and six months, 
payment orders for between 6,000 and 420,000 MOP, and acquit-
tals.230 
                                                   
ommendations, had failed to take into account a relevant consideration—a recog-
nized ground of judicial review in Hong Kong. 
230 Commission Against Corruption, Macao Special Administrative Region, 
2016 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION OF MACAO (2017), 
http://www.ccac.org.mo/en/intro/download/rep2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9JT9-XUJJ]. 
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The CCAC publishes some information in its Annual Report 
about the compliance of investigated bodies with its recommenda-
tions.  However, these are presented as case studies and give only a 
small sample of cases, meaning that the CCAC might simply have 
chosen for elaboration cases giving the impression that their work is 
effective, and perhaps more effective than it actually is.  Indeed, of 
the eight case studies included in the Annual Report for 2016, inves-
tigated bodies accepted the CCAC’s recommendations for imple-
mentation in 100% of cases.  It may be that the CCAC’s recommen-
dations are accepted for implementation with a similarly high rate 
of regularity as those of the Ombudsman in Hong Kong, but it is not 
possible to draw this conclusion in the absence of relevant quantita-
tive data.  The coverage in the Annual Report of positive cases might 
also be an exercise in promoting public confidence in the utility of 
the CCAC as a mechanism for grievance redress, but it again does 
not necessarily provide a representative sample of its caseload. 
Despite the relatively extensive scope of the Taiwanese Control 
Yuan’s jurisdiction, it cannot directly apply sanctions or compel in-
vestigated bodies to implement recommendations.  In this sense, it 
has been described in Taiwan as a “tiger without teeth.”231  How-
ever, the possibility for the head of an organization who fails to im-
plement recommendations to be impeached provides an incentive 
to act on those recommendations.  It is possible for an individual to 
be impeached and for the CDSF to decide against imposing mean-
ingful disciplinary measures.  However, there are significant repu-
tational consequences for a person found impeached, manifesting, 
for example, in difficulties securing career progression or in seeking 
election to public office.  As such, an impeached person will some-
times resign from office before the CDSF issues a final decision on 
disciplinary measures,232 suggesting that the “tiger” is not toothless 
or does not require teeth to be effective. 
The most recently published Annual Report of the Control Yuan 
is for 2016.  A total of 13,666 complaints were received, similar to the 
previous year, of which the top three categories, accounting for 
80.4% of all complaints received, related to judicial affairs (4,890), 
domestic affairs (3,907) or financial and economic affairs (2,192), 
again similar to that of the previous year.  The Control Yuan inves-
tigated 270 cases, of which 181 were assigned investigations and 89 
                                                   
231 Ger, supra note 28, at 27, 55. 
232 Id. at 25. 
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were self-initiated.  In the report for 2014, it was documented that 
71.3% of investigated cases related to the Executive Yuan and its 
subordinate agencies, 19.3% to local government, 5.7% to the Judi-
cial Yuan and its subordinate agencies, 0.8% to the Presidential Of-
fice and its subordinate agencies, 0.5% to the Examination Yuan and 
its subordinate agencies, and 2.5% to unspecified others.233  No sta-
tistic of this kind appears in the reports for 2015 or 2016.  The Control 
Yuan impeached sixty-nine persons (more than double the figure for 
the previous year), of whom eighteen were elected civil officials.  
Eight of the impeached persons were military officials—perhaps un-
usual as the military tends in other jurisdictions to evade open civil 
scrutiny in the name of defense and national security.  In 2014, a total 
of 419 persons were punished by their agencies for minor miscon-
duct on the request of the Control Yuan, but no comparable statistic 
appears in the reports for 2015 or 2016. 
Eighty-two corrective measures were proposed by the Control 
Yuan—similar to the previous year—the top five of which related to 
domestic and minority affairs (28), financial and economic affairs 
(16), transportation and procurement affairs (15), national defense 
and intelligence affairs (10) and educational and cultural affairs (8).  
83% of complaints received, and 41.8% of complaints investigated, 
by the Control Yuan related to human rights, broadly in line with 
the previous annual figures.  The National Audit Office of the Con-
trol Yuan investigated twenty-two cases.234  The overall picture of 
the Control Yuan is one of relatively effective supervision, though it 
appears that only a small number of complaints lead to impeach-
ment, censure or the proposal of corrective measures.  No data was 
presented on the compliance rate of investigated bodies with pro-
posed corrective measures, thus its effectiveness in that regard can-
not be determined. 
 
 
 
                                                   
233 CONTROL YUAN, Annual Report of the Control Yuan, 2014 (2015), 
http://www.cy.gov.tw/dl.asp?fileName=5122417465471.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M75Y-4FXC].  These figures are rounded to the nearest 0.1%. 
234 CONTROL YUAN, Annual Report of the Control Yuan, 2016 (2017), 
http://www.cy.gov.tw/dl.asp?fileName=7761615971.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D7EC-Q4C7]. 
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9.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
There are similarities between the ombudsman institutions of 
Greater China.  Each is primarily oriented toward supervision of the 
public sector, with jurisdiction over administrative malpractice and 
deficiency in government departments and non-governmental pub-
lic bodies.  Each can act on the basis of complaints received from 
members of the public, private companies and government bodies, 
and can perform direct investigations of their own volition.  Com-
plaints are not filtered by legislators, and each ombudsman conveys 
its primary substantive power through the making of recommenda-
tions with no general power to award remedies. 
However, these similarities seem too thin to bind the institutions 
to a single paradigm of administrative supervision.  There are sig-
nificant differences among the institutions in terms of their organi-
zational bases, powers, processes, and practices—and in the context 
of the specific jurisdiction where each operates.  Only in Mainland 
China is the ombudsman part of the executive proper, and is the 
work of the ombudsman shared with, and apparently subordinate 
to, the disciplinary arm of the ruling political party.  Only in Macau 
and Taiwan is the ombudsman constitutionally entrenched, but only 
in Taiwan is it on an equal constitutional footing with the executive.  
The ombudsman’s budget ultimately comes from the executive in 
each jurisdiction, though it is allocated or approved by the legisla-
ture in Hong Kong and Taiwan.  The Ombudsman of Hong Kong 
alone performs no active anti-corruption function, has no general 
jurisdiction over maladministration in the police force, and has no 
power to investigate anonymous complaints.  Only the MOS in 
Mainland China has the power to impose penalties on investigated 
persons, whereas the other institutions can only make recommenda-
tions or indirectly secure compliance to varying extents.  Only the 
Control Yuan actively monitors human rights compliance. 
There is no overall pattern to these characteristics.  They point to 
underlying differences in the way that the ombudsman institution 
is conceived in each jurisdiction, the way in which it operates, the 
powers that it exercises, and the ends to which its powers are exer-
cised.  Mainland China is an obvious outlier in terms of the status, 
role and method of the institution; and the political context in which 
the MOS operates is substantially different to that found in the other 
jurisdictions under review.  However, Taiwan is also an outlier in 
terms of the constitutional foundation of the Control Yuan and the 
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fact that its key power is that of impeachment—one usually found 
in legislatures.  Hong Kong could also be classified as an outlier in 
terms of its Ombudsman’s minimal oversight of anti-corruption and 
the police. 
It is to be expected that each institution is a product of local his-
torical, cultural, political and social contexts.  However, notwith-
standing continuing uncertainty over the status of Taiwan, the juris-
dictions under review have broadly been on a path of political, 
constitutional, and economic convergence.  The variation between 
the institutions and their respective systemic contexts spells difficul-
ties for a unified “Chinese” conception of the ombudsman.  Any fu-
ture attempt to align or harmonize the ombudsman institutions 
would face significant obstacles from the conceptual to the practical.  
Although the ombudsman is undoubtedly not unique in this regard, 
it is illuminating that even in a comparison of the institutions per-
forming this relatively innocuous function across Greater China, 
there is considerable diversity from the level of practical rules to 
constitutional first principles.  The ombudsman may have become a 
global phenomenon, but even in an area as politically, constitution-
ally, and economically associated as Greater China, there is no single 
paradigm of administrative supervision.  It is common for officials 
in Mainland China to describe aspects of its legal, political, and eco-
nomic systems as having “Chinese characteristics,” but this por-
trayal simply does not work in a comparison of the state ombuds-
man institutions in Greater China.  None of the jurisdictions under 
review can make an exclusive claim to “Chineseness” in the charac-
teristics of its public sector ombudsman.  Just as Greater China com-
prises four, diverse constituent jurisdictions, so it exhibits four di-
verse “Chinese” models of administrative supervision. 
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10.  TABLE 1 
 
 Ministry of      
Supervision 
(Mainland 
China) 
Ombudsman 
(Hong Kong) 
CCAC 
(Macau) 
Control Yuan 
(Taiwan) 
Year of        
establishment 
1949; 
 abolished 
1959; 
re-established 
1987 
1989 1999 1931; officially 
established     
under ROC       
Constitution 
1948 
Major           
relevant             
legislation 
Law on               
Administrative                  
Supervision 
Ombudsman 
Ordinance 
Organic Law of 
the Commis-
sion Against   
Corruption 
Control Act 
Constitutional 
entrenchment 
of institution 
No No Yes             
(Basic Law of 
Macau) 
Yes (ROC   
Constitution) 
Independent             
institution 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Institution has 
clearly de-
fined /       
distinct        
jurisdiction 
from other   
supervisory 
bodies 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Formally part 
of                  
executive 
Yes No No No 
Financially  
reliant on 
Government Government; 
budget allo-
cated by    
Legislative 
Council 
Government Government 
allocated 
budget;         
approved by 
Legislative 
Yuan 
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Head of       
institution   
appointed by 
President of 
PRC on nomi-
nation of 
Premier with 
approval of 
Standing Com-
mittee of Na-
tional People’s 
Congress 
Chief           
Executive of 
Hong Kong 
Central Peo-
ple’s Govern-
ment (“PRC”) 
on nomination 
of Chief Execu-
tive of Macau 
President of 
ROC with con-
sent of Legisla-
tive Yuan 
Head of         
institution   
removed / 
dismissed by 
No specific        
provision 
Chief Execu-
tive of Hong 
Kong with ap-
proval by res-
olution of 
Legislative 
Council 
Central        
People’s     
Government 
(“PRC”) on 
recommenda-
tion of Chief 
Executive of 
Macau 
No specific 
provision 
Circum-
stances in 
which head of 
institution can 
be removed / 
dismissed 
No specific      
provision 
Inability to 
discharge 
functions of 
office; misbe-
havior 
No specific 
provision 
No specific 
provision 
Substantive 
focus of        
institution’s 
work 
Political, eco-
nomic, and ad-
ministrative     
discipline 
Maladmin-
istration 
Corruption 
and                
administrative              
illegality 
Violation of 
law, neglect of 
duty, and mal-
administration 
Power to      
investigate    
corruption 
Yes No235 Yes Yes 
Monitors hu-
man rights    
compliance 
No specific 
provision236 
Limited Limited Yes 
                                                   
235 This is properly in the domain of the ICAC. 
236 A supervisory organ may make recommendations in situations including 
those “where the interests of the State or the collective or the lawful rights and in-
terests of citizens are impaired and remedial measures need to be taken” (Law on 
Administrative Supervision (Mainland China), art.23(3)), however no specific men-
tion is made of human rights. 
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Jurisdiction 
over govern-
ment depart-
ments 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Jurisdiction 
over non-gov-
ernmental 
public bodies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Jurisdiction 
over police 
Yes No237 Yes Yes 
Jurisdiction 
over courts 
Unclear238 No239 No specific 
provision 
Yes 
Jurisdiction 
over private 
bodies 
Partly240 No Partly No 
Can receive 
complaints 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                                                   
237 Except in relation to the Code on Access to Information. 
238 It is unclear whether the MOS has formal jurisdiction over courts and 
judges (consider Law of the People’s Republic of China on Judges (adopted at the 
22nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress, 
30 June 2001, arts. 32–35 and 44-47)).  The Law on Administrative Supervision 
(Mainland China), art. 43, states that where a supervisory organ, in the course of 
handling a matter under supervision, finds that the matter under investigation does 
not fall within the scope of the supervisory organ’s functions and duties, it shall 
transfer it to the unit that has the authority to handle it, which could include the 
transfer of a legal case to court.  It is specifically provided that a criminal case be 
transferred to a judicial organ.  However, it is further provided in the same article 
that the unit or organ that accepts the matter so transferred shall notify the relevant 
supervisory organ of how the matter is handled—it is unclear what happens if the 
unit or organ fails to do so, or reports back in a manner deemed unsatisfactory by 
the supervisory organ.  The People’s Courts and the procuratorates nevertheless 
have the power to supervise courts and judges, Constitution of the People’s Repub-
lic of China arts. 124–33; as does the Party through the CCDI.  The Complaint Re-
dress Department of the Supreme People’s Court also receives complaints about 
judicial cases. 
239 The Ombudsman only has jurisdiction over courts in relation to the regis-
tries and administrative offices of courts and tribunals for which the Judiciary Ad-
ministrator has responsibility, Ombudsman Ordinance (Hong Kong), Sched. 1. 
240 Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Main-
land China), Article 2 states that supervision extends to “persons in enterprises, 
institutions or social organizations who are appointed by the administrative organs 
of the State by means of delegation or dispatching or by other means.” 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
 
488 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:2 
from the  
public 
Can receive 
complaints 
from private 
companies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Can receive 
complaints 
from  
government 
bodies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Can process 
anonymous 
complaints 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Duty of         
secrecy or 
confidential-
ity in relation 
to complain-
ant 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Complaints 
filtered by 
legislators 
No No No No 
Can initiate 
investigations 
on own  
motion 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Can obtain 
evidence 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Can summon 
witnesses 
Yes241 Yes Yes Yes 
Penalty for No specific       Yes Yes No specific    
provision 
                                                   
241 The MOS can question departments and individuals under supervision, but 
can also call on the assistance of the “relevant administrative departments,” which 
are required to render assistance.  See Law on Administrative Supervision (Main-
land China) art. 22. 
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failure to co-
operate with 
institution 
provision242 
Power to 
award      
remedy 
Indirect243 No No No 
Power to im-
pose penalty 
on                 
investigated      
bodies 
Partly244 No No No 
Power to     
impose  
penalty on         
investigated 
persons 
Yes No No No 
Power to 
make recom-
mendation to 
investigated 
body 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Power to 
compel inves-
tigated body 
to implement 
recommenda-
tion 
Partly No No Indirect 
Power to 
make reports 
public 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                                                   
242 It is only stated that a unit or person “shall accept the supervisory proposal 
made by the supervisory organ in accordance with the law.”  See Implementation 
Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 27. 
243 See Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 23(3); see also 
Implementation Regulations of Law on Administrative Supervision (Mainland 
China) art. 22. 
244 The MOS can circulate a notice of criticism against a department.  See Law 
on Administrative Supervision (Mainland China) art. 45. 
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Decisions 
subject to in-
ternal review 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decisions 
subject to     
external           
review (on 
merits) 
No245 No No No 
 
 
                                                   
245 Decisions of the MOS are not subject to external review, though decisions 
of lower supervisory organs are subject to external review by hierarchically supe-
rior organs. 
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